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CONFRONTATION’S MULTI-ANALYST PROBLEM 
 
Paul F. Rothstein & Ronald J. Coleman  
 
ABSTRACT: The Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment affords the “accused” in 
“criminal prosecutions” the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against” them.  A 
particular challenge for courts over at least the last decade-plus has been the degree to 
which the Confrontation Clause applies to forensic reports, such as those presenting the 
results of a DNA, toxicology, or other CSI-type analysis.  Should use of forensic reports 
entitle criminal defendants to confront purportedly “objective” analysts from the lab 
producing the report?  If so, which analyst or analysts?  For forensic processes which 
require multiple analysts, should the prosecution be required to produce each and every 
analyst involved in handling the sample, participating in the testing process, or making 
any type of even minor representation contained in the report?  Although the Supreme 
Court has had several occasions to opine on the application of the Confrontation Clause 
to forensic reports, and although such precedent suggests criminal defendants enjoy at 
least some right to confront a forensic analyst, a great deal of uncertainty persists as to 
which analyst or analysts must be produced in cases involving multiple analysts.  A 
certiorari petition considered by the Supreme Court in March 2021—Chavis v. 
Delaware—could have permitted the Court to address this multi-analyst problem.  Even 
though the Court determined Chavis was not the appropriate vehicle for resolving the 
multi-analyst problem, this is an extremely important issue for labs, local stakeholders, 
and lower courts, and Justice Gorsuch even dissented from the Court’s denial of certiorari.  
The purpose of this Article is to identify and discuss six plausible approaches the Supreme 




Imagine Detective Harry Bosch of Hollywood Homicide has investigated the 
murder of a famous actress and her boyfriend.  Bosch has identified who he believes to be 
the killer and the key piece of evidence linking that accused to the double murder is a DNA 
match between a swab taken from the accused and a DNA sample from the crime scene: 
the actress’s chateau in the Hollywood Hills.  The DNA analysis was handled by a well-
known private forensics lab outside of California.  The District Attorney’s Office has just 
advised Bosch that, pursuant to the Confrontation Clause in the federal Constitution and 
relevant U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the accused will likely have the right to confront 
and cross-examine an analyst from the forensics lab.  Even though Bosch has been working 
Hollywood Homicide for many years, he is now perplexed.  He believes more than five 
analysts may have been involved in the forensic DNA analysis process, with some likely 
performing only very minor roles.  Could this mean that, unless each and every one of 
those analysts appears to testify at the accused’s trial, the accused could walk? 
The Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment affords the “accused” in 
“criminal prosecutions” the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against” them.1  The 
                                                 
1 U.S. Const. amend. VI.  The right to confront also applies to states pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965); see also David L. Faigman et al., 
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difficulty has come in determining when the Clause applies in a given case.  Since 
Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court has held that the Confrontation Clause applies 
only in cases involving a certain subset of out-of-court statements which could be 
considered equivalent to “bear[ing] testimony” in court.2  Such so-called “testimonial” 
statements of declarants not testifying at trial would only be admitted “where the declarant 
is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine.”3  However, Crawford and its progeny have not fully defined which statements 
would be “testimonial.”4   
A particular challenge for courts over at least the last decade-plus has been the 
degree to which the Confrontation Clause applies to forensic reports, such as those 
presenting the results of a DNA, toxicology, or other CSI-type analysis.  Should use of 
forensic reports entitle criminal defendants to confront purportedly “objective” analysts 
from the lab producing the report?  If so, which analyst or analysts?  For forensic processes 
which require multiple analysts, should the prosecution be required to produce each and 
every analyst involved in handling the sample, participating in the testing process, or 
making any type of even minor representation contained in the report?  Although the 
Supreme Court has had several occasions to opine on the application of the Confrontation 
Clause to forensic reports, and although such precedent suggests criminal defendants enjoy 
at least some right to confront a forensic analyst, a great deal of uncertainty persists as to 
which analyst or analysts must be produced in cases involving multiple analysts.5   
A certiorari petition considered by the Supreme Court in March 2021—Chavis v. 
Delaware—could have permitted the Court to address this multi-analyst problem.6  In 
Chavis, the prosecution was permitted to offer the results of forensic DNA analysis—
produced by a process involving multiple analysts—through the testimony of a single lab 
analyst.7  This testifying analyst’s report and testimony relied on her conclusion that other 
                                                 
Gatekeeping Science: Using the Structure of Scientific Research to Distinguish Between Admissibility and 
Weight in Expert Testimony, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 876 n.73 (2016). 
2 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-68 (2004).  
3 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. 
4 See infra, Part II.  Testimonial would seem to include “out-of-court written or oral statements meant or 
understood to provide some form of evidence for use at trial, especially if made solemnly and to a state 
actor or agent.”  See Ronald J. Coleman & Paul F. Rothstein, A Game of Katso and Mouse: Current 
Theories for Getting Forensic Analysis Evidence Past the Confrontation Clause, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 27, 
27 (2020) [hereinafter A Game of Katso and Mouse]. 
5 See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 
647 (2011); Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012); see also Stuart v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 36, 36 (2018) 
(Mem) (Gorsuch J., dissenting) (emphasizing “confusion” in this area); Ronald J. Coleman & Paul F. 
Rothstein, Grabbing the Bullcoming by the Horns: How the Supreme Court Could Have Used Bullcoming 
v. New Mexico to Clarify Confrontation Clause Requirements for CSI-Type Reports, 90 NEB. L. REV. 502, 
546 (2011) [hereinafter Grabbing the Bullcoming]; Ronald J. Coleman & Paul F. Rothstein, Williams v. 
Illinois and the Confrontation Clause (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.publicsquare.net/2011/12/ williams -v-
illinois-confrontation-clause/ [hereinafter Williams and the Confrontation Clause]; Paul F. Rothstein, 
Unwrapping the Box the Supreme Court Justices Have Gotten Themselves Into: Internal Confrontations 
Over Confronting the Confrontation Clause, 58 HOW. L.J. 479 (2015) [hereinafter Unwrapping the Box]; A 
Game of Katso and Mouse, supra note 4; Andrew Arons, Who Must Testify?: The Limits of the 
Confrontation Clause When it is Applied to Forensic Laboratory Reports, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 721, 723-
24 (2013). 
6 See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Chavis v. Delaware, No. 20-317 (Sept. 4, 2020) 
[hereinafter Chavis Cert Petition]. 
7 Chavis v. Delaware, 227 A.3d 1079, 1080-82 (Del. 2020). 
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analysts at the lab had performed their work properly, but her conclusion was based on a 
review of such other analysts’ entries in case files rather than on personal knowledge.8  The 
Delaware Supreme Court found that this did not violate the Confrontation Clause, and 
notwithstanding Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.9  Was 
the Delaware Supreme Court’s conclusion in Chavis correct, and how should courts handle 
the multi-analyst problem in future cases?   
The purpose of this Article is to identify and discuss six plausible approaches the 
U.S. Supreme Court may consider in addressing the multi-analyst problem.  The remainder 
of this Article proceeds as follows: Part II will provide relevant background on the 
Confrontation Clause, including the challenge posed by forensic reports; Part III will 
describe the Chavis case and petition; Part IV will present our six approaches for 
addressing the multi-analyst problem; and Part V will conclude. 
 
II. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE BACKGROUND 
  
Prior to Crawford v. Washington,10 Confrontation Clause cases had been analyzed 
under the regime established in Ohio v. Roberts.11  Pursuant to Roberts, a hearsay statement 
by a non-testifying declarant could only be admitted against a criminal defendant if the 
declarant was unavailable and the statement bore “adequate indicia of reliability.”12  
Crawford overruled Roberts and placed the focus on whether a given statement was 
“testimonial.”13 
 
A. The “New” Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause 
 
In Crawford, Michael Crawford had been tried for attempted murder and assault, 
and the state attempted to use his wife’s tape-recorded statements as evidence against 
him.14  The wife had made such statements during a police interrogation, but she did not 
testify at trial due to marital privilege rules in the state of Washington.15  Crawford 
argued that admission of her recorded statements violated his Confrontation Clause rights, 
but the wife’s recorded statements were nevertheless admitted and played for the jury.16 
                                                 
8 Id. at 1081. 
9 Id. at 1091 (emphasis added); Chavis v. Delaware, 592 U.S. ___ (2021) (Mem) (Gorsuch J., dissenting). 
10 541 U.S. 36. 
11 448 U.S. 56 (1980); see also Paul F. Rothstein & Ronald J. Coleman, Confronting Memory Loss, 55 GA. 
L. REV. 95, 100 (2020) [hereinafter Confronting Memory Loss]. 
12 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Under Roberts, “[r]eliability [could] be 
inferred without more in a case where the evidence [fell] within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.”  Id. 
13 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; see also David L. Noll, Constitutional Evasion and the Confrontation 
Puzzle, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1899, 1910 (2015) (“Crawford rejected the Roberts framework root and branch.”); 
Confronting Memory Loss, supra note 11, at 100 (noting “Crawford and its progeny altered the paradigm 
[.]”); Richard D. Friedman et al., Crawford, Davis, & the Right of Confrontation: Where Do We Go From 
Here?, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 507, 515-16 (2007) (noting Richard D. Friedman stated “I don’t think 
Roberts was working.”). 
14 541 U.S. at 38-40. 
15 Id. at 50.   
16 Id. at 40. 
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Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, determined that admission of the recorded 
statements violated the Confrontation Clause.17  He considered the Sixth Amendment’s 
text, lengthy history of confrontation rights, and prior Supreme Court precedent, and 
advanced two conclusions regarding the Confrontation Clause: (i) the Clause only applied 
to so-called “testimonial” statements; and (ii) use of these “testimonial” statements made 
by a declarant not appearing at trial was impermissible unless the declarant was 
“unavailable” and the defendant had had some prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant.18   
Justice Scalia reasoned that the primary evil at which the Clause was directed was 
the civil law style of criminal procedure, and in particular its using ex parte examinations 
against the accused.19  Such practices were exemplified by the “notorious” Sir Walter 
Raleigh treason trial, in which out-of-court evidence from Raleigh’s alleged accomplice, 
Lord Cobham, was used against Raleigh at trial and the judges refused Raleigh’s demand 
that Cobham appear.20  The Clause’s text, itself, also applied to “witnesses” meaning those 
who “bear testimony.”21  Accordingly, the Confrontation Clause applied only to what 
Justice Scalia referred to as “testimonial” statements: a certain class of out-of-court 
statements which are the functional equivalent of in-court testimony.22  Justice Scalia left 
setting out a “comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial’” for “another day [,]” but noted 
that whatever its definition, it applied to police interrogations, as well prior testimony at a 
former trial, before a grand jury, or at a preliminary hearing.23  On the facts of the case, 
Justice Scalia found that admission of Crawford’s wife’s statements without the 
opportunity for cross-examination violated the Confrontation Clause.24 
                                                 
17 Id. at 68-69. 
18 Id. at 40-60. 
19 Id. at 50. 
20 Id. at 44.  Justice Scalia noted that “[t]hrough a series of statutory and judicial reforms, English law 
developed a right of confrontation that limited these abuses.  For example, treason statutes required 
witnesses to confront the accused ‘face to face’ at his arraignment. . . . Courts, meanwhile, developed 
relatively strict rules of unavailability, admitting examinations only if the witness was demonstrably unable 
to testify in person. . . . Several authorities also stated that a suspect’s confession could be admitted only 
against himself, and not against others he implicated.”  Id. at 44-45 (citations omitted).   
21 Id. at 51; see also Jeffrey L. Fisher, Crawford v. Washington: The Next Ten Years, 113 MICH. L. REV. 
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 9, 10 (2014) (“The testimonial approach starts from the premise that the Confrontation 
Clause is not a rule of evidence but rather one of criminal procedure.”). 
22 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-60.  The Court noted: “Various formulations of this core class of ‘testimonial’ 
statements exist: ‘ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as 
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or 
similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,’; 
‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, 
prior testimony, or confessions,’; ‘statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,’ . . . . 
These formulations all share a common nucleus and then define the Clause’s coverage at various levels of 
abstraction around it.  Regardless of the precise articulation, some statements qualify under any 
definition—for example, ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing.”  Id. at 51-52 (citations omitted). 
23 Id. at 68; see also Natasha Crawford, Williams v. Illinois: Confronting Experts, Science, and the 
Constitution, 64 MERCER L. REV. 805, 810 (2013).  These, according to Justice Scalia, were the “modern 
practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed.”  Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 68. 
24 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69. 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O’Connor, decried the Court’s overruling 
of Roberts and “adoption of a new interpretation of the Confrontation Clause [which] is 
not backed by sufficiently persuasive reasoning to overrule long-established precedent.”25  
He believed that the new interpretation was unnecessary for deciding the case and that the 
Court had “cast[] a mantle of uncertainty over future criminal trials [.]”26  The Chief Justice 
noted that while the Court chose not to provide a comprehensive definition for 
“testimonial,” state and federal prosecutors needed answers now—not months or even 
years from now—on what is covered by the term aside from the specific examples the 
Court had enumerated.27   
 After Crawford, the Court would attempt to devise an approach for determining 
when a given statement would be testimonial.28  That approach came to focus on the 
statement’s objective primary purpose. 
 
B. The Primary Purpose Test 
 
 The Court has come to rely on analyzing the objective primary purpose of a 
statement to determine whether such statement should be considered testimonial.  The 
Court developed this test in Davis v. Washington29 and Michigan v. Bryant,30 and has since 
applied it in cases such as Ohio v. Clark.31 
 In Davis, the Court created an “emergency” exception to the class of testimonial 
statements.32  Davis called upon the Court to rule on two consolidated appeals: (i) State v. 
Davis,33 which concerned the state seeking to admit statements made to a 911 operator 
before police arrived on the scene; and (ii) Hammon v. State,34 which concerned the state 
seeking to admit statements made by an alleged victim after police arrived on the scene 
and the alleged perpetrator appeared under control.35  Justice Scalia authored the Court’s 
opinion and stated: 
 
Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all 
conceivable statements—or even all conceivable statements in response to 
                                                 
25 Id. at 69, 74-76; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Assessing Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1331, 1353 (2006) (“In Crawford v. Washington, the Court changed the law, overruled precedent, and 
provided more protections under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment by limiting hearsay 
testimony that could be used against criminal defendants.”). 
26 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69, 74-76.  The Chief Justice noted that, in his view, “[t]he Court’s distinction 
between testimonial and nontestimonial statements, contrary to its claim, is no better rooted in history than 
our current doctrine.”  Id. 
27 Id. at 75. 
28 Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1865, 1867 (2012) (“As 
ambitious as the case was, Crawford only mapped out the rough contours of the long-awaited 
Confrontation Clause revolution, leaving a number of important questions ‘for another day.’”) (certain 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
29 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
30 562 U.S. 344 (2011). 
31 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015). 
32 See generally Davis, 547 U.S. 813. 
33 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005). 
34 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005); see also Frederick Schauer, Constitutionalism and Coercion, 54 B.C. L. 
REV. 1881, 1890-91 (discussing Hammon). 
35 Davis, 547 U.S. at 818-21. 
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police interrogation—as either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to 
decide the present cases to hold as follows: Statements are nontestimonial 
when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances 
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.  They are 
testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such 
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.36 
 
Applying this standard, the Court found that the statements to the 911 operator in State v. 
Davis were nontestimonial, since “the circumstances of [the declarant’s] interrogation 
objectively indicate[d] its primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency” and the declarant was not simply “a weaker substitute for live 
testimony at trial [.]”37  In contrast, the statements in Hammon were testimonial, since “the 
circumstances [indicated] that the interrogation was part of an investigation into possibly 
criminal past conduct [,]” no emergency was in progress, and the statements “were an 
obvious substitute for live testimony [.]”38 
 Justice Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, to 
criticize the Court’s adoption of the primary purpose test.39  In addition to the test being 
hard for the courts to apply, Justice Thomas felt that it characterized as “testimonial,” and 
thus inadmissible, evidence that bore little resemblance the type of evidence the Court had 
previously determined was targeted by the Confrontation Clause.40  Justice Thomas set out 
his formality and solemnity view, pursuant to which “statements regulated by the 
Confrontation Clause must include ‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized 
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.’”41  
He also previewed the so-called “mixed motives” problem—which would be discussed 
further in Bryant—in stating: 
 
In many, if not most, cases where police respond to a report of a crime, 
whether pursuant to a 911 call from the victim or otherwise, the purposes of 
an interrogation, viewed from the perspective of the police, are both to 
respond to the emergency situation and to gather evidence. . . . Assigning 
one of these two “largely unverifiable motives,” . . . primacy requires 
constructing a hierarchy of purpose that will rarely be present—and is not 
                                                 
36 Id. at 822.  For purposes of its decision, the Court considered the 911 operator in State v. Davis an agent 
of law enforcement.  See id. at 823 n.2. 
37 Id. at 828-34 (internal question marks omitted).  The Court noted that, in cases such as Sir Walter 
Raleigh’s and certain others, “the ex parte actors and the evidentiary products of the ex parte 
communication aligned perfectly with their courtroom analogues.  [The State v. Davis declarant’s] 
emergency statement does not.  No ‘witness’ goes into court to proclaim an emergency and seek help.”  Id. 
at 828. 
38 Id. at 816-34.  
39 Id. at 834. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 836 (citation omitted).  Justice Thomas would come to repeat this formality and solemnity view in 
future cases, but it has, so far, not gained much traction with the other Justices. 
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reliably discernible.  It will inevitably be, quite simply, an exercise in 
fiction.42 
 
 In Bryant, the Court further developed its primary purpose approach and sought to 
address the mixed motives problem.  Bryant concerned attempted use of statements made 
by an alleged victim to police who found the victim mortally wounded in the parking lot 
of a gas station.43  The declarant-victim did not appear at trial, since he had passed away, 
but the police officers who had spoken to the victim on the scene testified as to what the 
victim had told them.44  Justice Sotomayor, for the Court, built upon the principles the 
Court had set out in Davis: 
 
When, as in Davis, the primary purpose of an interrogation is to respond to 
an “ongoing emergency,” its purpose is not to create a record for trial and 
thus is not within the scope of the [Confrontation] Clause.  But there may 
be other circumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies, when a statement 
is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute 
for trial testimony.  In making the primary purpose determination, standard 
rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be 
relevant.  Where no such primary purpose exists, the admissibility of a 
statement is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the 
Confrontation Clause.45 
   
The Court also noted that the situation in Bryant was different from that in Davis, and thus 
required further clarification of the emergency exception from Davis: 
 
We now face a new context: a nondomestic dispute, involving a victim 
found in a public location, suffering from a fatal gunshot wound, and a 
perpetrator whose location was unknown at the time the police located the 
victim.  Thus, we confront for the first time circumstances in which the 
“ongoing emergency” discussed in Davis extends beyond an initial victim 
to a potential threat to the responding police and the public at large.46 
 
In making the determination of whether the primary purpose of a given interrogation would 
be to assist an ongoing emergency, the Court said it would “objectively evaluate the 
circumstances in which the encounter occurs and the statements and actions of the 
parties.”47  The Court recognized the mixed motives problem, pursuant to which 
interrogators might have more than one motivation in asking questions and declarants 
                                                 
42 Id. at 839 (citations omitted).  As will be discussed further below, the mixed motives problem arises 
where, for instance, an interrogator has more than one motivation in asking questions and a declarant has 
more than one motivation in answering such questions or otherwise making statements.  Bryant, 562 U.S. 
at 367-69. 
43 Bryant, 562 U.S. at 348. 
44 Id. at 348-50. 
45 Id. at 358-59. 
46 Id. at 359. 
47 Id. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3815870
 8
might have more than one motive in making statements.48  It stated that in many 
circumstances, the primary purpose would be best ascertained by looking at the contents 
of questions and answers.49  By taking the combined approach, the Court reasoned, 
problems arising from looking only to one participant—such as the mixed motives 
problem—could be ameliorated.50  On  the facts of Bryant, the Court determined that the 
emergency exception applied and the victim’s statements were non-testimonial.51 
 Justice Thomas authored a concurring opinion, again relying on his formality and 
solemnity view.  He determined that the statements lacked sufficient formality and so 
would not be testimonial.52 
 Justice Scalia dissented, charging the Court with having reached a “patently 
incorrect conclusion on the facts” and having “distort[ed] our Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence [.]”53  He noted that Crawford and Davis had not addressed whose 
perspective was relevant for the primary purpose test: the interrogator’s, the defendant’s, 
or both.54  He strongly disagreed with the Court’s combined approach, and instead believed 
it was the declarant’s intention which should count.55  Justice Scalia proclaimed himself 
                                                 
48 Id. at 367-69.  The Court stated that “Police officers in our society function as both first responders and 
criminal investigators.  Their dual responsibilities may mean that they act with different motives 
simultaneously or in quick succession. . . . Victims are also likely to have mixed motives when they make 
statements to the police.  During an ongoing emergency, a victim is most likely to want the threat to her 
and to other potential victims to end, but that does not necessarily mean that the victim wants or envisions 
prosecution of the assailant.  A victim may want the attacker to be incapacitated temporarily or 
rehabilitated.  Alternatively, a severely injured victim may have no purpose at all in answering questions 
posed; the answers may be simply reflexive.  The victim’s injuries could be so debilitating as to prevent her 
from thinking sufficiently clearly to understand whether her statements are for the purpose of addressing an 
ongoing emergency or for the purpose of future prosecution.  Taking into account a victim’s injuries does 
not transform this objective inquiry into a subjective one.  The inquiry is still objective because it focuses 
on the understanding and purpose of a reasonable victim in the circumstances of the actual victim—
circumstances that prominently include the victim’s physical state.”  Id. 
49 Id. at 367-68.  The Court provided an “extreme” example: “if the police say to a victim, ‘Tell us who 
did this to you so that we can arrest and prosecute them,’ the victim’s response that ‘Rick did it,’ appears 
purely accusatory because by virtue of the phrasing of the question, the victim necessarily has prosecution 
in mind when she answers.”  Id. at 368. 
50 Id. at 368.    
51 Id. at 377-78.  Justice Kagan did not take part in the consideration or decision in Bryant.  Id. at 378. 
52 Id. at 378.  Justice Thomas also again criticized the Court’s primary purpose test.  Id. at 379. 
53 Id. at 380; see also David Crump, Overruling Crawford v. Washington: Why and How, 88 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 115, 132-37  (2012) (discussing issues with the “primary purpose” test and arguing that Bryant “is 
a compelling illustration of the unworkability that is built into the Crawford rationale.”); Richard D. 
Friedman & Jeffrey L. Fisher, The Frame of Reference and Other Problems, 113 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 43, 45 (2014) (“We agree that it is confusing to speak of an actor’s primary purpose 
‘objectively considered.’  Purpose is a subjective matter.  But this aspect of the problem would disappear if 
the Court spoke, as we believe it should, in terms of reasonable anticipation—rather than purpose—of 
prosecutorial use.”).  Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate dissenting opinion, which agreed with portions of 
Justice Scalia’s dissent.  Bryant, 562 U.S. at 395.  She also emphasized that, had the issue been properly 
tendered in Bryant, she would have considered whether the dying declarations exception survived the 
Court’s recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.  Id. 
54 Bryant, 562 U.S. at 381.  Justice Scalia noted that in Crawford and Davis, the statements were 
testimonial when viewed from any perspective, and he believed the same was true in Bryant.  Id. 
55 Id.  According to Justice Scalia, “[f]or an out-of-court statement to qualify as testimonial, the declarant 
must intend the statement to be a solemn declaration rather than an unconsidered or offhand remark; and he 
must make the statement with the understanding that it may be used to invoke the coercive machinery of 
the State against the accused. . . . That is what distinguishes a narrative told to a friend over dinner from a 
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“at a loss to know how” the Court’s approach would ameliorate the mixed motives 
problem, since adding the mixed motives of police officers to the mixed motives of 
declarants would only compound the problem.56  He also, among other things, blasted the 
Court’s new “expansive exception to the Confrontation Clause for violent crimes”57 and 
its “resurrected interest in reliability [.]”58 
 More recently, in Clark, the Court considered the primary purpose approach in the 
child abuse context. 59  Darius Clark had sent his girlfriend out of town for the purposes of 
prostitution and said he would care for her children while she was away.60  One day later, 
a teacher noticed, among other things, red marks on the girlfriend’s three year-old-son, and 
the son identified Clark as the abuser.61  The teacher alerted authorities by way of a child 
abuse hotline.62  At trial, the prosecution introduced the son’s statements to his teachers 
and Clark was found guilty on several counts of felonious assault.63  The question for the 
Court was whether admission of the boy’s statements when he was unavailable to be cross-
examined violated the Confrontation Clause.64 
 Justice Alito, for the Court, determined that, since neither the teachers nor the boy 
had the primary purpose of assisting in the prosecution of Clark, the boy’s statements did 
                                                 
statement to the police. . . . The hidden purpose of an interrogator cannot substitute for the declarant’s 
intentional solemnity or his understanding of how his words may be used.”  Id. 
56 Id. at 383.  In this regard, Justice Scalia noted, “[n]ow courts will have to sort through two sets of mixed 
motives to determine the primary purpose of an interrogation.  And the Court’s solution creates a mixed-
motive problem where (under the proper theory) it does not exist—viz., where the police and the declarant 
each have one motive, but those motives conflict.  The Court does not provide an answer to this glaringly 
obvious problem, probably because it does not have one.”  Id.; see also Crump, supra note 53, at 132-33. 
57 Bryant, 562 U.S. at 388.  Justice Scalia noted: “Because Bryant posed a continuing threat to public safety 
in the Court’s imagination, the emergency persisted for confrontation purposes at least until the police 
learned his ‘motive for and location after the shooting.’ . . . It may have persisted in this case until the 
police ‘secured the scene of the shooting’ two-and-a-half hours later. . . . (The relevance of securing the 
scene is unclear so long as the killer is still at large—especially if, as the Court speculates, he may be a 
spree-killer.)  This is a dangerous definition of emergency.  Many individuals who testify against a 
defendant at trial first offer their accounts to police in the hours after a violent act.  If the police can 
plausibly claim that a ‘potential threat to . . . the public’ persisted through those first few hours, . . . (and if 
the claim is plausible here it is always plausible) a defendant will have no constitutionally protected right to 
exclude the uncross-examined testimony of such witnesses.  His conviction could rest (as perhaps it did 
here) solely on the officers’ recollection at trial of the witnesses’ accusations.”  Id. at 388-89. 
58 Id. at 388-92.  In terms of reliability, Justice Scalia argued: “Reliability tells us nothing about whether a 
statement is testimonial.  Testimonial and nontestimonial statements alike come in varying degrees of 
reliability.  An eyewitness’s statements to the police after a fender-bender, for example, are both reliable 
and testimonial.  Statements to the police from one driver attempting to blame the other would be similarly 
testimonial but rarely reliable.”  Id. at 392. 
59 135 S. Ct. 2173.  For a discussion of ambiguous-purpose statements of abuse victims prior to Clark, see 
Paul F. Rothstein, Ambiguous-Purpose Statements of Children and Other Victims of Abuse Under the 
Confrontation Clause, 44 SW. L. REV. 508 (2015). 
60 Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2177.  Clark was also his girlfriend’s pimp.  Id. 
61 Id. at 2177-78.  The son had apparently referred to Clark by his nickname of “Dee” in the identification.  
Id.  Additional injuries were subsequently discovered.  Id. 
62 Id. at 2178. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 2177, 2181.  The son did not testify because the trial court found him incompetent to testify.  Id. at 
2178.  Pursuant to Ohio law, “children younger than 10 years old are incompetent to testify if they ‘appear 
incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts and transactions respecting which they are examined, or 
of relating them truly.’”  Id. (citation omitted). 
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not violate the Confrontation Clause and were admissible.65  Justice Alito noted that, 
because at least certain statements to individuals other than law enforcement officers 
conceivably could raise Confrontation Clause concerns, the Court would refrain from 
adoption of a categorical rule excluding such statements from Confrontation Clause 
protection.66  However, such statements, according to the Court, were “much less likely” 
to be found testimonial.67  The Court considered the boy’s statements in Clark non-
testimonial since: (i) they were made to his teachers not law enforcement; (ii) they occurred 
in connection with an ongoing emergency of suspected child abuse; (iii) there was no 
indication that the conversation’s primary purpose was to gather evidence to prosecute 
Clark; (iv) statements by very young children rarely (if ever) implicated the Confrontation 
Clause; and (v) there was “strong evidence” that statements made in similar circumstances 
to those in Clark would have been admissible at common law.68  As to this last point, the 
Court noted that the primary purpose test was a necessary—but not sufficient—condition 
for Confrontation Clause exclusion, since the Clause did “not prohibit the introduction of 
out-of-court statements that would have been admissible in a criminal case at the time of 
the founding.”69 
 Justice Scalia authored a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice 
Ginsburg.70  He wrote separately to “protest the Court’s shoveling of fresh dirt upon the 
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation so recently rescued from the grave in 
[Crawford].”71  He took issue with, for instance, the Court’s characterization of Crawford, 
and with the suggestion that the primary purpose test was a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition.72  Justice Scalia did emphasize his agreement with the Court’s refusal to 
determine two questions unnecessary to the Court’s holding:  
 
[W]hat effect Ohio’s mandatory-reporting law has in transforming a private 
party into a state actor for Confrontation Clause purposes, and whether a 
more permissive Confrontation Clause test—one less likely to hold the 
statements testimonial—should apply to interrogations by private actors.73 
 
Still, Justice Scalia concluded that the statements in Clark would be non-testimonial 
pursuant to the normal test for police interrogations.74 
                                                 
65 Id. at 2177.  The Court found Clark’s arguments to the contrary unavailing.  Id. at 2182-83. 
66 Id. at 2181. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 2181-82.   
69 Id. (“Certainly, the statements in this case are nothing like the notorious use of ex parte examination in 
Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial for treason, which we have frequently identified as ‘the principal evil at which the 
Confrontation Clause was directed.’”) (citations omitted).   
70 Id. at 2183. 
71 Id. at 2184. 
72 Id. at 2184-85 (noting “[t]he opinion asserts that future defendants, and future Confrontation Clause 
majorities, must provide “evidence that the adoption of the Confrontation Clause was understood to require 
the exclusion of evidence that was regularly admitted in criminal cases at the time of the founding.”) 
(citation omitted).  Justice Scalia noted that the Court got the burden backwards, and in fact the burden is 
on the prosecution seeking to introduce the evidence.  Id. 
73 Id. at 2183. 
74 Id. at 2183-84. 
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 Justice Thomas also concurred, and stated he would not have applied the primary 
purpose test in Clark.75  Instead, he would apply the same test for statements to law 
enforcement agents as he applies to private persons: “assessing whether those statements 
bear sufficient indicia of solemnity to qualify as testimonial.”76  He concluded that the 
son’s statements did not bear the requisite indicia of solemnity and were non-testimonial.77 
 Even following Clark, there remains a great deal of uncertainty in the application 
of the primary purpose test.78  However, one of the most difficult issues the Supreme Court 
has had to face in the Confrontation Clause context is the challenge presented by forensic 
reports.    
 
C. The Forensic Reports Challenge 
 
 The application of the Confrontation Clause to forensic reports has proved 
particularly divisive in the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Court considered this issue in a series 
of three cases: (i) Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts79; (ii) Bullcoming v. New Mexico80; and 
(iii) Williams v. Illinois.81  We will refer to this series of cases as the “Melendez-Diaz 
Trilogy.” 
 In Melendez-Diaz, Luis Melendez–Diaz had been convicted on drug charges for 
selling cocaine.82  At trial, the state entered into evidence seized bags allegedly containing 
narcotics, along with three “certificates of analysis [.]”  These certificates reflected the 
results of forensic analysis showing the substance in the bags contained cocaine, and they 
had been sworn before a notary public pursuant to state law.83 Melendez–Diaz raised a 
Confrontation Clause objection, arguing that Crawford required the forensic analysts to 
testify at trial, but his objection was overruled.84  After appeals, the Supreme Court agreed 
to hear the case.85 
 Justice Scalia, for the Court, held that admitting the certificates was a violation of 
the Confrontation Clause.86  For Justice Scalia, deciding the case required “little more” 
                                                 
75 Id. at 2185. 
76 Id. at 2186 (citations omitted). 
77 Id. 
78 For instance, questions persist, such as: (i) what would make a purpose “primary” in the situation of 
mixed purposes; (ii) whose purpose should be considered more significant—a declarant or a questioner—if 
their purposes are materially different; (iii) what does it mean that the purpose should be determined 
“objectively” from the standpoint of a “reasonable person” under the same circumstances; (iv) could 
volunteered statements without interrogation constitute a Confrontation Clause violation; and (v) should a 
court break statements down into component parts so that each part may be separately scrutinized under the 
primary purpose test?  See Paul F. Rothstein, A Comment on the Supreme Court’s Decision in Ohio v. 
Clark (June 19, 2015), https://casetext.com/analysis/a-comment-on-the-supreme-courts-decision-in-ohio-v-
clark [hereinafter Comment on Clark]; see also Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173. 
79 557 U.S. 305. 
80 564 U.S. 647.   
81 567 U.S. 50. 
82 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 307-09. 
83 Id. at 308. 
84 Id. at 309. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 309, 329 
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than applying the Court’s holding in Crawford.87  The Court determined that the certificates 
at issue were “quite plainly affidavits” and had “little doubt” they fell “within the ‘core 
class of testimonial statements’” described in Crawford.88  The Court also found that the 
analysts were “witnesses” for Confrontation Clause purposes and, absent unavailability 
and a prior opportunity for cross-examination, Melendez-Diaz had a right to confront them 
at trial.89 
 Justice Thomas authored a concurring opinion, again reiterating his formality and 
solemnity view.90  In the instant case, he agreed with the Court’s opinion that the 
certificates were affidavits and that they were testimonial.91 
 Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices Roberts, Alito, and Breyer in the dissent.92  
Justice Kennedy charged the Court with having “[swept] away” a long established rule 
pursuant to which scientific analysis could be admitted without the analyst who produced 
the analysis testifying.93  Most concerning, according to Justice Kennedy, was the fact that 
the Court had made no attempt to acknowledge the differences between conventional 
witnesses and laboratory analysts performing scientific tests.94   The dissent considered 
“ordinary” or conventional witnesses—such as those in Crawford and Davis—the targets 
of the Confrontation Clause.95  It argued that the Court’s ruling was “divorced from 
precedent, common sense, and the underlying purpose of the [Confrontation] Clause [,]” 
and had the “vast potential to disrupt criminal procedures that already give ample 
protections against the misuse of scientific evidence.”96 
 Importantly, the dissent also argued, among other things, that the Court’s ruling did 
not make clear which among a string of analysts involved in a test would be required to 
testify.97  The dissenters offered the example of a routine drug test involving four 
individuals: (i) an individual to prepare the sample, put it in a machine and retrieve the 
printout from the machine (often a graph); (ii) an individual to interpret the graph; (iii) an 
                                                 
87 Id. at 329; see also Crump, supra note 53, at 137-38 (“After Crawford, the holding in Melendez-Diaz 
seemed unremarkable, even if its result was debatable.”). 
88 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310-311.  The Court noted that the certificates were “functionally identical to 
live, in-court testimony,” and not only were they created under circumstances leading objective witness to 
reasonably believe they would be available to be used at trial, but their sole purpose under Massachusetts 
state law was to offer “prima facie evidence [.]”  Id.  The Court also assumed the analysts would have been 
aware of the certificates’ evidentiary purpose, since it was reprinted on the certificates themselves.  Id. 
89 Id. at 311. 
90 Id. at 329-30. 
91 Id. at 330. 
92 Id.   
93 Id. 
94 Id.   
95 Id. at 330-31.  Justice Kennedy noted that the word “analyst” does not appear in the Constitution, nor is 
there any accepted definition of it.  Id. at 332; see also Andrew W. Eichner, The Failures of Melendez-Diaz 
v. Massachusetts and the Unstable Confrontation Clause, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 437, 454 (2011) (“Not only 
does the [Court’s Melendez-Diaz] opinion fail to answer the critical question of how to comprehensively 
define ‘testimonial,’ as left open by Crawford, but the holding also declares that ‘analysts’ who submit 
scientific affidavits for the purposes of a trial are witnesses giving testimonial statements under the Sixth 
Amendment without actually defining the characterizing traits that dictate exactly who falls within that 
category.”).  Justice Scalia was unpersuaded that scientific analysts creating reports should be treated 
differently than conventional witnesses for confrontation purposes.  Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 315-24. 
96 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 331-32. 
97 Id. at 332.  
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individual to calibrate the machine and certify it is in working order; and (iv) an individual 
such as a director to certify that any subordinates followed procedures.98 Requiring even 
one such analyst to testify would “disrupt if not end many prosecutions [,]” and if all were 
required to testify, the Court had, “for all practical purposes, forbidden the use of scientific 
tests in criminal trials.”99   
The majority opinion in the case responded to the dissent’s critique regarding the 
involvement of multiple analysts: 
 
Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, . . . we do not hold, and it is not the 
case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain 
of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, 
must appear in person as part of the prosecution’s case.  While the dissent 
is correct that “[i]t is the obligation of the prosecution to establish the chain 
of custody,” . . . this does not mean that everyone who laid hands on the 
evidence must be called.  As stated in the dissent’s own quotation, . . . “gaps 
in the chain [of custody] normally go to the weight of the evidence rather 
than its admissibility.”  It is up to the prosecution to decide what steps in 
the chain of custody are so crucial as to require evidence; but what 
testimony is introduced must (if the defendant objects) be introduced live.  
Additionally, documents prepared in the regular course of equipment 
maintenance may well qualify as nontestimonial records.100 
 
This question of which analyst must testify would be partially addressed in the second case 
in the Melendez-Diaz Trilogy: Bullcoming. 
 In Bullcoming, Donald Bullcoming had been arrested for driving while intoxicated, 
and the prosecution sought to use a lab report at trial certifying that Bullcoming’s blood 
alcohol concentration (“BAC”) exceeded the relevant threshold.101  The  BAC analysis 
underlying the lab report utilized a gas chromatograph machine, and operation of such 
machine required specialized knowledge and training.102  At trial, rather than calling the 
analyst who signed the certification as a witness, the prosecution instead offered testimony 
from a different analyst.103  This testifying analyst had familiarity with testing procedures 
                                                 
98 Id. at 332-33; see also Stephen Wills Murphy, The Confrontation Clause and the Ongoing Fight to Limit 
Melendez-Diaz, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (ONLINE) (2010) https://harvardlpr.com/online-articles/the-
confrontation-clause-and-the-ongoing-fight-to-limit-melendez-diaz/ (“While Melendez-Diaz stated that 
admission of a forensic report requires accompanying testimony by an analyst, the Court did not specify 
which analyst, or analysts, would be required to testify—although both the majority and the dissent noted 
the importance of this issue.”); Grabbing the Bullcoming, supra note 5, at 535-38 (providing example of 
typical toxicology test involving up to five individuals). 
99 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 332-33; see also Casey Unwin, No Longer the Right to Remain Silent: 
Cross-Examining Forensic Analyst Testimony, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1025, 1042 (2010).     
100 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 n.1 (emphasis added and citations omitted).  Justice Scalia also 
responded to the dissent’s dire predictions by arguing that the Confrontation Clause could not be 
“disregard[ed] . . . at our convenience [,]” and by doubting those dire predictions.  Id. at 325-26. 
101 Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 651. 
102 Id. at 654.  Several steps are also involved in the process, and human error may occur at each of these 
steps.  Id. 
103 Id. at 651. 
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at the lab, but did not observe or participate in the actual test on Bullcoming’s sample.104  
The New Mexico Supreme Court considered the BAC analysis testimonial in light of 
Melendez-Diaz, but determined that the testimony of the testifying analyst was sufficient 
for the Confrontation Clause.105  First, the court reasoned that the analyst who certified the 
report was a “mere scrivener” who had simply transcribed results from the machine.106  
Second, the court found that the qualified expert witness who testified could serve as a 
“surrogate” witness for the analyst who certified the report.107  The U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and reversed the New Mexico Supreme Court.108 
 Justice Ginsburg, for the Court, determined that admission of the report was a 
violation of the Confrontation Clause.109  It was impermissible, according to the Court, to 
admit a testimonial statement of one individual (the certifying analyst) through the trial 
testimony of a separate individual (the testifying analyst).110  The certifying analyst was 
more than a “mere scrivener [,]” since he made several representations regarding the 
sample not revealed in the machine-produced data.111  Moreover, the “surrogate” testimony 
of the testifying analyst was insufficient, since it could not reveal what the certifying 
analyst observed or knew about the actual test or testing process employed.112  Nor could 
the surrogate testimony uncover any “lapses or lies” by the certifying analyst.113  Finally, 
the Court considered the assertions in the BAC report testimonial, notwithstanding that 
such report was unsworn.114 
 The same four Justices who had dissented in Melendez-Diaz also dissented in 
Bullcoming.115  The dissent noted that some of its principal objections to the Court’s 
underlying theory had been set out in its Melendez-Diaz dissent, so there was no need to 
repeat them.116  The dissent also felt that—whether or not one agreed with Melendez-
Diaz—it was wrong to extend such holding to cover the situation in Bullcoming.117  The 
dissent charged that, prior to its Bullcoming opinion, the Court had never found that the 
Confrontation Clause would bar admission of scientific findings where an employee from 
                                                 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 651-56. 
106 Id. at 657. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 657-58. 
109 Id. at 652-56.  Justice Ginsburg’s opinion did not constitute the Court’s opinion as to Part IV 
(concerning the burden on the prosecution) or footnote 6 (concerning the “primary purpose” analysis).  Id. 
at 650, 659 n.6, 665-58. 
110 Id. at 657.  Absent unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination, of course.  Id. 
111 Id. at 659-60. 
112 Id. at 661. 
113 Id. at 661-62.  The Court found it significant that the certifying analyst had been put on unpaid leave, 
and the testifying analyst lacked knowledge of the reasons for that.  Id. at 662.  The Court also emphasized 
that there was no assertion that the testifying analyst held any “independent opinion” as to Bullcoming’s 
BAC.  Id. 
114 Id. at 664-65.  In a portion of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion not constituting the opinion of the Court, 
Justice Ginsburg also rejected arguments “that unbending application of the Confrontation Clause to 
forensic evidence would impose an undue burden on the prosecution.”  Id. at 665. 
115 Id. at 674. 
116 Id. at 674-75. 
117 Id. (noting “because [the testifying analyst in Bullcoming] was not the analyst who filled out part of the 
form and transcribed onto it the test result from a machine printout, the Court finds a confrontation 
violation.”). 
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the relevant lab authenticated the findings, testified on the lab’s practices and methods, and 
was cross-examined at trial.118   
The dissent also took time to emphasize that the information in the report resulted 
from a scientific process involving multiple participants’ acts, including: (i) receipt of the 
sample; (ii) recording its receipt; (iii) storing the sample; (iv) placing it into the testing 
device; (v) transposing the test results’ printout onto the report; and (vi) reviewing of the 
results.119  The record revealed, according to the dissent, that the role of the certifying 
analyst in Bullcoming was “no greater than that of anyone else in the chain of custody.”120  
The dissent further charged: 
 
It is not even clear which witnesses’ testimony could render a scientific 
report admissible under the Court’s approach.  Melendez–Diaz stated an 
inflexible rule: Where “analysts' affidavits” included “testimonial 
statements,” defendants were “entitled to be confronted with the analysts” 
themselves. . . . Now, the Court reveals, this rule is either less clear than it 
first appeared or too strict to be followed.  A report is admissible, today’s 
opinion states, if a “live witness competent to testify to the truth of the 
statements made in the report” appears. . . . Such witnesses include not just 
the certifying analyst, but also any “scientist who . . . perform[ed] or 
observe[d] the test reported in the certification.”121 
 
The dissent noted that the Court in Melendez-Diaz had insisted its opinion did not “require 
everyone in the chain of custody to testify” but had then “qualified that ‘what testimony is 
introduced must . . . be introduced live.’”122  According to the dissent: 
 
This could mean that a statement that evidence remained in law-
enforcement custody is admissible if the statement’s maker appears in court.  
If so, an intern at police headquarters could review the evidence log, declare 
that chain of custody was retained, and so testify.  The rule could also be 
that [] the intern’s statement—which draws on statements in the evidence 
log—is inadmissible unless every officer who signed the log appears at trial.  
That rule, if applied to [Bullcoming], would have conditioned admissibility 
of the report on the testimony of three or more identified witnesses. . . . In 
other instances, 7 or even 40 witnesses could be required. . . . The court has 
thus—in its fidelity to Melendez–Diaz—boxed itself into a choice of evils: 
                                                 
118 Id. at 675.  The dissent also, among other things, criticized the Court for permitting certain principles—
such as solemnity—to “weave[] in and out of the Crawford jurisprudence [,]” and for fashioning an 
approach pursuant to which it was “not even clear which witnesses’ testimony could render a scientific 
report admissible [.]”  Id. at 678-79. 
119 Id. at 676. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 678-79. 
122 Id. at 679-80. 
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render the Confrontation Clause pro forma or construe it so that its dictates 
are unworkable.123 
 
Justice Sotomayor authored a concurrence, in which she, among other things, 
emphasized the limitations of the Court’s opinion.124  Specifically, Justice Sotomayor 
articulated four “factual circumstances” not presented in Bullcoming, which implied that 
she might theoretically have come out differently had any such circumstances been 
present.125  First, Bullcoming was not a case in which the prosecution had suggested an 
alternative purpose for the BAC report.126  Second, Bullcoming did not present the situation 
of a “supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to 
the scientific test” taking the stand.127  Third, Bullcoming was not a case in which the expert 
witness was asked to provide her independent opinion regarding underlying testimonial 
reports which were not, themselves, admitted.128  Fourth, Bullcoming did not present a 
situation in which the prosecution sought to simply introduce machine-generated results, 
such as a gas chromatograph’s printout.129  Justice Sotomayor also emphasized that the 
Court’s opinion did not mean that everyone noted on the report needed to testify.130 
 In Williams—the final case in the Melendez-Diaz Trilogy—the Court was asked to 
consider a case quite similar to Justice Sotomayor’s third hypothetical in Bullcoming: “an 
expert witness . . . asked for [an] independent opinion about [an] underlying testimonial 
report[]” not itself admitted.”131  The defendant, Sandy Williams, had been convicted of 
rape by way of a bench trial.132  During the trial, the prosecution had called Sandra 
Lambatos, an expert, to testify that a DNA profile, which was produced by Cellmark, an 
outside laboratory, matched a DNA profile produced by the state’s police laboratory using 
a sample of the defendant’s blood.133  The Cellmark report was never admitted, nor was it 
shown to the factfinder.134  Lambatos did not read from, or quote, the Cellmark report, and 
she never identified it as the source of opinions she expressed.135  Lambatos also provided 
an explanation of the notations on certain documents which were admitted as business 
records, testifying that, according to the records, swabs from the victim had been sent to, 
and received from, Cellmark.136  Lambatos did not make any other statement offered for 
                                                 
123 Id. at 680; see also John Rafael Peña Perez, Confronting the Forensic Confirmation Bias, 33 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 457, 466 (2015) (“Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming created line-drawing problems because 
anywhere from six to twelve analysts could be involved with the procedures of a single forensic test.”).  
124 Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 668. 
125 Id. at 668, 672-74. 
126 Id. at 672.  For instance, the prosecution had not argued the report was necessary for Bullcoming’s 
medical treatment.  Id. 
127 Id. at 672-73. 
128 Id. at 673 (noting Federal Rule of Evidence 703 explains “that facts or data of a type upon which experts 
in the field would reasonably rely in forming an opinion need not be admissible in order for the expert’s 
opinion based on the facts and data to be admitted [.]”). 
129 Id. at 673-74.  For a more detailed discussion of the state of the law before and after Bullcoming, see 
Grabbing the Bullcoming, supra note 5. 
130 Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 670 n.2 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 n.1). 
131 Id. at 673.   
132 Williams, 567 U.S. at 56-57, 63. 
133 Id. at 56. 
134 Id. at 62. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 56. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3815870
 17
the purposes of identification of the sample used to derive the profile or for purposes of 
establishing how Cellmark tested or used the sample.137 Nor had Lambatos vouched for the 
accuracy of Cellmark’s profile.138  On cross-examination, Lambatos did admit that she had 
not conducted or observed the vaginal swab testing, and that she relied on the Cellmark 
DNA profile for her testimony.139 
Williams contended that the expert’s testimony violated the Confrontation 
Clause.140  According to the Court’s plurality opinion, Williams’s main argument was that 
“the expert went astray when she referred to the DNA profile provided by Cellmark as 
having been produced from semen found on the victim’s vaginal swabs.”141 
Justice Alito authored the plurality opinion, joined by the other Melendez-Diaz 
dissenting Justices.142  The plurality found no Confrontation Clause violation in Lambatos 
testifying for two independent reasons.143  First, out-of-court statements related by an 
expert solely for purposes of explaining assumptions on which the expert’s opinion rested 
were not offered for their truth.144  As Justice Alito stated: 
 
[T]he Cellmark report was not introduced into evidence. An expert witness 
referred to the report not to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the 
report, i.e., that the report contained an accurate profile of the perpetrator’s 
DNA, but only to establish that the report contained a DNA profile that 
matched the DNA profile deduced from petitioner’s blood.  Thus, . . . the 
report was not to be considered for its truth but only for the “distinctive and 
limited purpose” of seeing whether it matched something else. . . . The 
relevance of the match was then established by independent circumstantial 
evidence showing that the Cellmark report was based on a forensic sample 
taken from the scene of the crime.145 
 
Second, even if the Cellmark report had been admitted, there would still be no 
Confrontation Clause violation, since such report “was not prepared for the primary 
purpose of accusing a targeted individual.”146  According to the plurality, the Cellmark 
report’s primary purpose “was to catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large, not to 
obtain evidence for use against petitioner, who was neither in custody nor under suspicion 
at that time.”147  Indeed, the plurality noted that those at Cellmark could not possibly have 
known the profile would inculpate Williams or anyone else who had a DNA profile in the 
database.148  Importantly, Justice Alito noted, among other things, that since multiple 
                                                 
137 Id. at 56-57. 




142 Id. at 55-56. 
143 Id. at 57-58. 
144 Id. at 58. 
145 Id. at 79 (citations omitted). 
146 Id. at 84. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 84-85.  Justice Alito pointed out that the position of the Cellmark technicians was not unique, and 
that laboratory technicians asked to work on DNA profiles often had no idea what the consequence of their 
work would be.  Id. at 85.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3815870
 18
technicians often work on each profile, it was likely that the sole purpose of each of these 
technicians was simply to perform her or his task in accordance with the accepted 
procedures.149 
Justice Thomas authored a concurring opinion.150  Justice Thomas wrote separately 
to again emphasize his formality and solemnity view.151  He believed that the Cellmark 
statements had been offered for their truth, but that the report was insufficiently formal to 
be testimonial.152  Justice Thomas stated that he “share[d] the dissent’s view of the 
plurality’s flawed analysis.”   
Justice Breyer also wrote separately to emphasize that he would have permitted 
additional briefing on a question not sufficiently treated by the plurality or the dissent: how 
the Confrontation Clause applied to the  “panoply of crime laboratory reports and 
underlying technical statements written by (or otherwise made by) laboratory 
technicians?”153  In that context, “what, if any, are the outer limits of the “testimonial 
statements” rule set forth in” Crawford.154  He noted that pursuant to “well-established” 
evidence principles, an expert is entitled to rely on out-of-court, inadmissible, statements 
as a basis for the forming of her expert opinion if such statements are of a kind experts in 
the field would normally rely on, and the prosecution need not enter such out-of-court 
statements for their truth.155  In speaking of how the dissent would abandon this “well-
established rule [,]” Justice Breyer noted:    
 
Once one abandons the traditional rule, there would seem often to be no 
logical stopping place between requiring the prosecution to call as a witness 
one of the laboratory experts who worked on the matter and requiring the 
prosecution to call all of the laboratory experts who did so. Experts—
especially laboratory experts—regularly rely on the technical statements 
and results of other experts to form their own opinions.  The reality of the 
matter is that the introduction of a laboratory report involves layer upon 
layer of technical statements (express or implied) made by one expert and 
relied upon by another.  Hence my general question: How does the 
Confrontation Clause apply to crime laboratory reports and underlying  
technical statements made by laboratory technicians?156 
 
                                                 
149 Id. at 85.  He also mentioned that “the knowledge that defects in a DNA profile may often be detected 
from the profile itself provides a further safeguard.”  Id. 
150 Id. at 103-118. 
151 Id. at 103. 
152 Id. at 103-111.  Justice Thomas concluded that “[t]he Cellmark report lacks the solemnity of an affidavit 
or deposition, for it is neither a sworn nor a certified declaration of fact.  Nowhere does the report attest that 
its statements accurately reflect the DNA testing processes used or the results obtained. . . . The report is 
signed by two “reviewers,” but they neither purport to have performed the DNA testing nor certify the 
accuracy of those who did. . . . And, although the report was produced at the request of law enforcement, it 
was not the product of any sort of formalized dialogue resembling custodial interrogation.”  Id. at 111. 
153 Id. at 86. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 88. 
156 Id. at 89. 
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He appended an outline of “the way that a typical modern forensic laboratory 
conducts DNA analysis” and discussed the following hypothetical example built upon an 
illustrative case raised by the dissent:157  
 
[A]ssume that the admissibility of the initial laboratory report into trial had 
been directly at issue.  Who should the prosecution have had to call to 
testify?  Only the analyst who signed the report noting the [DNA] match?  
What if the analyst who made the match knew nothing about either the 
laboratory’s underlying procedures or the specific tests run in the particular 
case?  Should the prosecution then have had to call all potentially involved 
laboratory technicians to testify?  Six to twelve or more technicians could 
have been involved. . . .  Some or all of the words spoken or written by each 
technician out of court might well have constituted relevant statements 
offered for their truth and reasonably relied on by a supervisor or analyst 
writing the laboratory report.  Indeed, petitioner’s amici argue that the 
technicians at each stage of the process should be subject to cross-
examination.158 
 
 Relatedly, Justice Breyer asked, “[t]o what extent might the ‘testimonial 
statements’ requirement embody one or more (or modified versions) of the[] traditional 
hearsay exceptions [?]”159  He stated that prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges needed 
to know what the Constitution required, and noted that treatise writers and lower courts 
offered a variety of solutions, some more “readily compatible” with Crawford than 
                                                 
157 Id. at 99-102.  According to Justice Breyer’s appendix: “As many as six technicians may be involved in 
deriving the [DNA] profile from the suspect’s sample; as many as six more technicians may be involved in 
deriving the profile from the crime-scene sample; and an additional expert may then be required for the 
comparative analysis, for a total of about a dozen different laboratory experts.  Each expert may make 
technical statements (express or implied) during the DNA analysis process that are in turn relied upon 
by other experts.  The amici dispute how many of these experts the Confrontation Clause requires to be 
subject to cross-examination.”  Id. at 100.  The appendix provides a sample process for a profile of a 
suspect’s sample and crime scene sample, each consisting of six steps: (i) evidence examination; (ii) 
extraction; (iii) quantification; (iv) amplification; (v) electrophoresis; and (vi) report.  Id. at 100-102 
(providing brief descriptions of each step).  After the profile processes are complete, an analyst makes a 
comparison of the two electropherograms and profiles/reports and prepares her or his own report setting out 
her or his conclusions regarding the DNA match.  Id. 
158 Id. at 89-90; see also Brandon L. Garrett, The Crime Lab in the Age of the Genetic Panopticon, 115 
MICH. L. REV. 979, 990 n.57 (2017). 
159 Williams, 567 U.S. at 91. 
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others.160  In the absence of any additional briefing, Justice Breyer sided with the dissenting 
views in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, and joined the plurality opinion.161 
Justice Kagan was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Scalia and Sotomayor in the 
dissent.162  Justice Kagan emphasized that prior Court precedent had held that if the 
prosecution wished to introduce results of forensic testing, it had to afford the defense an 
“opportunity to cross-examine an analyst responsible for the test.”163  According to the 
dissent, cross-examining the analyst was particularly likely to reveal whether vials had 
been switched, tests incompetently run, samples contaminated, or results recorded 
inaccurately.164  Under the Court’s Confrontation Clause precedent, the dissent considered 
Williams “an open-and-shut case” in which Williams was not afforded his confrontation 
rights.165  The dissent also attacked the Court for its inability to settle on a rationale for 
finding no Confrontation Clause violation.166  Justice Kagan pointed out that five Justices 
had specifically reject each aspect of the plurality’s reasoning, and that the result was “five 
votes to approve the admission of the Cellmark report, but not a single good 
explanation.”167 
Williams represents the Supreme Court’s last major opinion on forensic reports and 
the Confrontation Clause.  Following Williams—which did not produce a usable majority 
and since which there has been a change in the makeup168 of the Court—the current state 
                                                 
160 Id. at 91-92.  For instance, Justice Breyer noted that “The New Wigmore . . . lists several nonexclusive 
approaches to when testifying experts may rely on testing results or reports by nontestifying experts (i.e., 
DNA technicians or analysts), including: (1) ‘the dominant approach,’ which is simply to determine the 
need to testify by looking [at] ‘the quality of the nontestifying expert’s report, the testifying expert’s 
involvement in the process, and the consequent ability of the testifying expert to use independent judgment 
and interpretive skill’; (2) permitting ‘a substitute expert to testify about forensic science results only when 
the first expert is unavailable’ (irrespective of the lack of opportunity to cross-examine the first expert, . . . ; 
(3) permitting ‘a substitute expert’ to testify if ‘the original test was documented in a thorough way that 
permits the substitute expert to evaluate, assess, and interpret it’; (4) permitting a DNA analyst to introduce 
DNA test results at trial without having ‘personally perform[ed] every specific aspect of each DNA test in 
question, provided the analyst was present during the critical stages of the test, is familiar with the process 
and the laboratory protocol involved, reviews the results in proximity to the test, and either initials or signs 
the final report outlining the results’; (5) permitting the introduction of a crime laboratory DNA report 
without the testimony of a technician where the ‘testing in its preliminary stages’ only ‘requires the 
technician simply to perform largely mechanical or ministerial tasks . . . absent some reason to believe 
there was error or falsification’; and (6) permitting introduction of the report without requiring the 
technicians to testify where there is a showing of ‘genuine unavailability.’”  Id. (citations and certain 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
161 Id. at 86. 
162 Id. at 118.   
163 Id. at 119. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 119-20.  
166 Id. at 120. 
167 Id.  The dissent argued that “[t]he plurality’s first rationale endorses a prosecutorial dodge; its second 
relies on distinguishing indistinguishable forensic reports.”  Id.  The dissent also noted that Justice 
Thomas’s approach suffered from “similar flaws.”  Id.  For further discussion of Williams, both before and 
after the Court’s opinion, see Williams and the Confrontation Clause, supra note 5 and Unwrapping the 
Box, supra note 5. 
168 Since Williams was decided, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Ginsburg have been replaced by Justices 
Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, but it is still not fully clear how the Court with these new Justices would 
rule on the forensic reports issue.  See, e.g., Confronting Memory Loss, supra note 11, at 144.  However, 
Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion in Stuart may mean his views on the Confrontation Clause are similar 
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of the law in this area remains unclear.169  In particular, in cases involving more than one 
forensic analyst, it has not been resolved which analyst or analysts must testify.170  The 
Chavis petition currently pending before the Supreme Court could permit further 
clarification in this area.171 
 
III. CHAVIS: THE RECENT MULTI-ANALYST PETITION 
 
 In Chavis v. Delaware, Dakai Chavis had been convicted of second degree burglary 
of a ground-floor apartment.172  During the investigation, police had concluded that the 
burglar had entered through a bedroom window.173  The police had also obtained a DNA 
sample from the apartment window and had sent that sample to Bode Cellmark Forensics 
                                                 
to those of Justice Scalia.  See, e.g., id.; A Game of Katso and Mouse, supra note 4, at 51; Richard D. 
Friedman, First word from Justice Gorsuch on the Confrontation Clause, The Confrontation Blog (Nov. 
19, 2018), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2018/11/first-word-from-justice-gorsuch-on.html (“it 
appears, from the first evidence [Stuart], that the passing of Justice Scalia’s seat to him will not do the 
doctrine any harm. . . . Ultimately, I choose to look at the glass half full.   Justice Gorsuch appears to be on 
the right side, and we didn’t know that before.  Perhaps Justice Kavanaugh is on the wrong side, but 
[t]here’s no way of knowing for sure . . . ”); Laird Kirkpatrick, The Admissibility of Forensic Reports in the 
Post-Justice Scalia Supreme Court, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Aug. 27, 2019), 
https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/ (stating it would appear Justice Gorsuch would side with the dissent in 
Williams and support the result in Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz just as Justice Scalia had, but noting it 
remained unclear what position Justice Kavanaugh would take).  
169 See, e.g., supra note 168; Edward K. Cheng & G. Alexander Nunn, Beyond the Witness: Bringing a 
Process Perspective to Modern Evidence Law, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1077, 1110 n.183 (2019) (“The Melendez-
Diaz line of cases leaves exactly who needs to be called somewhat murky.”); Richard D. Friedman, 
Confrontation and Forensic Laboratory Reports, Round Four, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 51, 81 (2012) (“That 
the Williams Court was so splintered makes it difficult to determine what the holding was.”); Jennifer 
Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause, 2012 SUP. 
CT. REV. 99, 100 (2012) (“In the most recently decided case, Williams v. Illinois, the court issued a 
bewildering array of opinions in which majority support for admitting the evidence at issue was awkwardly 
knitted together out of several incompatible doctrinal bases.”); Lauren McLane, Confronting the Twenty-
First-Century Marian Examination, 82 ALB. L. REV. 949, 1002 (2019) (“Words like ‘muddled’ and ‘abyss’ 
have been used by the lower courts to describe the state of the Supreme Court’s confrontation clause 
doctrine in the forensic evidence context.”); George Fisher, The Crawford Debacle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 17, 25 (2014) (“The result is a Court so badly splintered that when it came time for 
Justice Alito to summarize Williams from the bench on the day the Court ruled, he all but confessed his 
inability [.]”); Ronald J. Allen, The Hearsay Rule as a Rule of Admission Revisited, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1395, 1396 (2016) (noting “the Supreme Court has made a mess of confrontation jurisprudence [.]”) 
(certain internal quotation marks omitted); Erin Murphy, The Mismatch Between Twenty-First-Century 
Forensic Evidence and Our Antiquated Criminal Justice System, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 633, 657 (2014) 
(referring to Williams as “a highly fractured opinion [.]”); Jules Epstein, Continuing 
Crawford/Confrontation “Confusion”, 34 CRIM. JUST. 67, 68 (2019) (referring to the “ongoing national 
‘confusion’ regarding Williams [.]”); Marc D. Ginsberg, The Confrontation Clause and Forensic Autopsy 
Reports—A “Testimonial”, 74 LA. L. REV. 117, 135 (2013) (“State supreme court justices have not been 
shy in commenting on the uncertainty and ambiguity of Supreme Court opinions pertaining to forensic 
documents and the Confrontation Clause.”). 
170 See generally supra notes 168-69; Arons, supra note 5, at 723-24; see also Grabbing the Bullcoming, 
supra note 5, at 535-38. 
171 See generally Chavis Cert Petition, supra note 6. 
172 227 A.3d at 1080-82. 
173 Id. at 1082. 
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(“Bode Cellmark”), an out-of-state lab, for analysis.174  During a search of Chavis’s 
residence, his mouth was swabbed for DNA and that sample was also sent to Bode 
Cellmark.175  At trial, Sarah Siddons, an analyst from Bode Cellmark, testified that the 
sample from the bedroom window at the scene of the burglary (referred to as the “crime 
scene” or “evidence” sample) matched the sample from Chavis (referred to as the 
“reference” or “known person” sample).176   
Several analysts from Bode Cellmark had handled both the “crime scene” and 
“known person” samples and performed steps in the process on them.177  Siddons 
performed certain steps in the analysis process of both samples, but did not witness or 
participate in all of them.178  Siddons, among other things, confirmed that the two samples 
matched and, since she was not involved in certain steps performed by other analysts, 
“reviewed the case files for both [] sample[s] . . . and confirmed that Standard Operating 
Procedures were followed.”179  Satisfied that the other analysts had performed earlier steps 
in accordance with Bode Cellmark’s standard operating procedures, and competently, 
Siddons authored a report, which contained the expert opinion she offered at trial.180   
Prior to trial, the state had moved in limine to allow introduction of Bode 
Cellmark’s DNA-testing analysis through the testimony of only Siddons and without the 
need to produce other Bode Cellmark analysts.181  The state also argued that, pursuant to 
Delaware Rule of Evidence 703,182 as an expert, Siddons could “rely on facts and data 
provided by the other analysts in rendering her opinion.”183  Chavis countered that, among 
other things, Siddons’s assurances that the other analysts performed their analyses 
competently was insufficient to meet the Confrontation Clause.184  Notwithstanding 
Chavis’s opposition, the court determined that the only “testimonial statements” in Bode 
Cellmark’s DNA-analysis results were those by Siddons.185  As such, Siddons was the only 
witness who testified in support of the results and conclusions of Bode Cellmark’s DNA 
testing at trial.186   
                                                 
174 Id. at 1081-2.  Bode Cellmark was “a private laboratory in Lorton, Virginia that specializes in forensic 
DNA testing.”  Id. at 1082.  In collecting the sample, “an evidence-detection specialist used a DNA 
collection kit supplied by Bode to process the suspected point of entry (a window) at the crime scene, 
wiping the area of interest with both wet and dry swabs.”  Id. at 1083.  The sample was placed in a sealed 
envelope and, as far as the court knew, was delivered to the outside lab without incident.  Id. 
175 Id. at 1081-82.  The detective obtained Chavis’s DNA sample “using a collection method known as 
buccal swabbing, by scraping the inside of Chavis’s cheeks with a Q-tip-like swab to collect skin cells.”  Id. 
at 1083.  The sample was placed in a sealed envelope and, as far as the court knew, was delivered to the 
outside lab without incident.  Id.  It should be noted that the “manner in which the investigating officers 
collected the crime-scene DNA sample and Chavis’s reference sample and delivered those samples to Bode 
[Cellmark] [wa]s not at issue [].”  Id. 
176 Id. at 1081-86. 
177 Id. at 1081.  
178 Id. at 1081-86 (describing process in respect of each sample and noting relevant analysts). 
179 Id. at 1086 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
180 Id.  
181 Id. 
182 This state rule is very similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 703. 
183 Id. at 1086. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 1087. 
186 Id.  Chavis had no objection to Siddons being deemed an expert.  Id. 
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At trial, Siddons testified in detail regarding the testing steps taken by non-
testifying analysts, but did not recount any conclusions reached, or statements made, by 
any such analysts.187  Siddons did explain: 
 
[S]he was able to generate one DNA profile from the two evidence samples 
and a profile from the reference sample. . . . [and that] according to [her], 
“the male profile obtained from the evidence sample was a match to the 
male profile from [Chavis’s] reference sample”, matching at all fifteen loci.  
Siddons’s written report, which was admitted into evidence, noted that 
“[t]he probability of randomly selecting an unrelated individual with this 
DNA profile at 15 of 15 loci tested is approximately . . . 1 in 26 quintillion 
in the U.S. African American population.188 
 
On appeal, Chavis argued, among other things, that the DNA evidence’s 
introduction violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause because the prosecution 
failed to present all analysts who had conducted the DNA analysis.189  The Supreme Court 
of Delaware noted that the parties disagreed as to whether the entries the non-testifying 
analysts made in the case files regarding their work—upon which Siddons relied in 
generating her report and offering her testimony—were testimonial.190  Chavis argued that 
Siddons made explicit and implicit testimonial statements which Siddons relied upon and 
relayed to the jury.191  The state countered that the non-testifying analysts’ work was not 
testimonial for several reasons, including: (i) “many of the processes for generating DNA 
profiles” were “automated[]”; (ii) “the DNA profiles” were “self-verifying because [t]he 
DNA profiles [themselves] would have reflected any errors” which were “committed 
during the DNA testing’s preliminary stages []”; (iii) the implicit statements by the non-
testifying analysts, upon which Siddons relied in her testimonial affidavit, “were 
insufficiently formal to themselves qualify as testimonial statements []”; and (iv) Siddons 
was entitled to rely upon the entries of the non-testifying analysts in the case files because 
such entries were “facts or data . . . of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject” and they thus “need not 
be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted.”192 
After considering U.S. Supreme Court precedent, as well as precedent from lower 
courts, the Supreme Court of Delaware concluded that the entries in the case files from the 
non-testifying analysts were not testimonial, since such entries “did not take the form of 
statements” which were “designed to serve as a substitute for in-court testimony against 
Chavis.”193  As such, there was no Confrontation Clause violation.194  In connection with 
the U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that none of the 
                                                 
187 Id.  
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 1081.  
190 Id. at 1088. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. (certain internal quotation marks omitted). 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 1082. 
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Melendez-Diaz Trilogy were on point in resolving the present case.195  The court stated, 
among other things: 
 
Here, an expert, Siddons, testified to the results of a forensic analysis, but 
in doing so, relied upon information that experts in her field typically rely 
upon—case files by other testing analysts who manipulate the DNA 
samples in order to prepare them for the expert, but who do not themselves 
analyze the result.  Because these other analysts are not testifying as to the 
final result of the forensic analysis, it is not clear whether their work is 
testimonial under Melendez-Diaz, which dealt with certificates attesting to 
the results of the forensic testing.  Nor is Siddons a surrogate expert as in 
Bullcoming—she was herself involved in the preparation and analysis of the 
two DNA samples.  And there is no testimony as to a hypothetical here [as 
in Williams]—Siddons worked on both DNA samples and testified as to the 
results of both.196 
 
However, the court found that Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz pointed to an “indicator” as 
to when a statement will be testimonial: “the purpose of the statement in proving an 
essential element of the crime.”197   
The Delaware Supreme Court found its conclusion consistent with its own 
precedent and precedent from other states.198  For instance, the court “tend[ed] to agree” 
with other states that have reached the conclusion “that analysts who only manipulate the 
DNA sample and who state that they have followed standard operating procedures in doing 
so are not making testimonial statements.”199   
The Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion continued that, in Chavis, it could not be 
said that the manipulation of the samples by the non-testifying analysts, or their case file 
entries, were testimonial.200  That the “primary purpose” of their entries was not to 
substitute for trial testimony or provide evidence “against” Chavis was demonstrated by 
the fact that they were not offered as trial evidence.201  The court emphasized that, based 
on the available record, the court could not be sure what the statements even were.202  It 
could infer such statements concerned whether the non-testifying analysts followed 
standard operating procedures, but such statements (i.e., that the analysts “examined and 
                                                 
195 Id. at 1090-91.   
196 Id.  The court noted that Siddons performed the quantification, amplification, and electrophoresis steps 
in connection with the “crime scene” and “known person” samples, in addition to confirming the match.  
Id. at 1085-86. 
197 Id. at 1091 (emphasis added).  The court noted: “Regrettably, the case files produced by the 
nontestifying analysts, which Siddons relied upon and which Chavis seems to claim contain the 
nontestifying analysts’ out-of-court-statements, are absent from the record.  But assuming that we could 
conjure up those statements despite their absence, we could not go so far as to presume that they include 
assertions of fact tending to prove an essential element of the crimes.”  Id.  The court found Chavis “falls 
somewhere between” Williams and Bullcoming; and, unlike in those cases, the testifying analyst in Chavis, 
was “involved in the testing of both DNA samples and [] certified the results.”  Id. at 1092. 
198 Id. at 1091-94.   
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manipulated the DNA swabs in a particular manner”) would not provide testimony 
“against” Chavis, as is required by the Confrontation Clause.203 
Nor, according to the court, would the relevant entries have been offered in order 
to “show that Chavis committed an act that was an element of the crimes with which” he 
was charged.”204  Although the DNA profile—which was the “end result” of the combined 
work of all the analysts—was offered to prove the burglar’s identity, “the intermediary 
steps taken do not themselves prove—or aim to prove—anything.”205  Unable to identify 
any testimonial statements by the non-testifying analysts, the court determined that 
Chavis’s Confrontation Clause claim must fail.206 
The court stated that this did not mean that the non-testifying analysts’ statements 
were irrelevant to the opinion Siddons offered.207  To the contrary: 
 
Siddons acknowledged that the other analysts’ adherence to standard 
operating procedures and their entries in the case files to that effect were 
essential to her conclusion.  But just because a declarant makes an out-of-
court statement that may have some relevance to a fact at issue in a criminal 
trial does not make that declarant a “witness[ ] against” the defendant within 
the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.208  
 
On September 4, 2020, Chavis filed a certiorari petition for U.S. Supreme Court 
review.209  The Chavis petition, among other things, purported to ask the same question 
Justice Breyer raised in Williams: “Which analysts must the prosecution call to testify 
when more than one analyst was involved in testing” the forensic evidence introduced at 
trial against the defendant?210  It argued that, while an answer to the question presented has 
never been clear, Williams made the answer less clear and “cast doubt on the precedent” 
for state and federal courts.211  Chavis argued that, unlike in Williams, the DNA report and 
testimony in Chavis was entered for its truth and there was “no issue” of the report’s 
accusatory nature.212  According to Chavis, when the Delaware Supreme Court found no 
testimonial statements by the non-testifying analysts, it had ignored that Siddons’s report 
and testimony contained three testimonial statements—two of which were hearsay—on 
which she relied and which had been introduced to establish the element of 
identification:213  
 






208 Id. at 1093-94 (noting “Chavis might have challenged Siddons’s opinion or testimony on the grounds 
that they lacked an adequate foundation because of her lack of personal involvement in the early stages of 
the testing process or that Siddons’s reliance on information by the nontestifying analysts was improper 
under D.R.E. 703 . . . [b]ut Chavis chose not to challenge Siddons’s report or testimony on these 
evidentiary grounds [.]”). 
209 See generally Chavis Cert Petition, supra note 6. 
210 Id. at 15. 
211 Id. at 15-16. 
212 Id. at 24. 
213 Id. 
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In her lab report, Siddons asserts that the reference sample from which the 
one profile was generated came from the buccal swab of Chavis.  She also 
asserts that the evidentiary sample from which the other profile was 
generated came from the crime scene window.  Finally, she asserts that the 
two profiles matched . . . [and] [s]he testified similarly.214 
 
Chavis argued that, by the time Siddons retrieved the tubes which contained extracted 
DNA, she was accessing evidence which she could not identify as being provided by law 
enforcement.215  Without the non-testifying analysts’ representation, Siddons would not 
know the “identity” of the samples she used to generate profiles which she compared in 
the case.216  Siddons, therefore, incorporated the testimonial statements of the non-
testifying analysts as to the samples’ identification, but then testified to the profiles’ 
identification as a fact, certifying their truth in her report.217  Accordingly, Chavis asserted 
that a “straightforward application” of Bullcoming required the Delaware Supreme Court 
to conclude that each analyst responsible for a testimonial statement in the report should 
have been produced.218 
 On March 8, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.219  Justice Gorsuch 
dissented from the denial of certiorari, noting he “dissent[ed] for the reasons set out in [his 
opinion dissenting from denial of certiorari in] Stuart v. Alabama.”220  In his opinion 
dissenting from denial of certiorari in Stuart, Justice Gorsuch had referred to the “various 
opinions [in Williams as] hav[ing] sown confusion in courts across the country” and called 
for greater “clarity” in the law.221   
 
IV. ADDRESSING THE MULTI-ANALYST PROBLEM 
 
 Cases such as Chavis and Justice Breyer’s statements in Williams make clear that, 
notwithstanding the Melendez-Diaz Trilogy, the multi-analyst problem has not yet been 
resolved.  In this Part, we will set out six plausible approaches that the Court might consider 
in addressing this problem.  
We note at the outset that our analysis here rests upon several important 
assumptions.  First, we assume, unless and until the Court states otherwise, that Crawford 
                                                 
214 Id. at 24-25. 
215 Id. at 25. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. at 26.  The petition argues: “because of the confusion created by Williams, the court’s focus veered 
toward Siddons’ independent judgement and participation in the process rather than on the testimonial 
nature of the hearsay statements contained in her report and testimony that was introduced into evidence, 
who made those statements and whether Chavis was able to confront those individuals.”  Id.  Chavis also 
argued that resolving the issue presented in Chavis was important to the administration of justice and that 
Chavis was a good vehicle to resolve it.  Id. at 26-29 (arguing “[o]ne analyst’s assurances at trial regarding 
the actions of the other analysts is insufficient to satisfy a defendant’s right to confront and cross-examine 
those analysts.”). 
219 Chavis v. Delaware, 592 U.S. ___ (2021) (denying certiorari). 
220 Id. (Gorsuch J., dissenting). 
221 Stuart, 139 S. Ct. at 36-37 (Gorsuch J., dissenting); see also A Game of Katso and Mouse, supra note 4, 
at 28. 
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and the Melendez-Diaz Trilogy remain binding precedent.222  Second, and flowing from 
our first assumption, we assume that where testimonial statements are contained in a 
forensic report and that report is entered into evidence at trial, the accused will generally 
have the right to confront at least one forensic analyst.  Third, we assume that the Court 
will find that not all analysts in a multi-analyst forensic process need to appear.223  Indeed, 
we believe that the Supreme Court—at least as constituted prior to Justices Gorsuch, 
Kavanaugh, and Barrett joining the Court—has been searching for a means of mitigating 
the impact of Crawford in forensic report cases, and would prefer to limit the number of 
analysts who must testify.224  Fourth, and finally, we assume that the Court would generally 
                                                 
222 For instance, the Court could always decide to overrule Crawford, but that is beyond the scope of our 
discussion here.  See Confronting Memory Loss, supra note 11, at 124 n.189 (noting possibility of 
overruling Crawford); Crump, supra note 53 at 115, 150 (discussing “overruling of Crawford”). 
223 It would be highly difficult logistically to produce each and every analyst, and the Court’s opinion in 
Melendez-Diaz emphasized that not all analysts need to testify.  See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 n.1.  
Even late Justice Scalia, one of the great proponents of the right to confront, has noted in a different 
confrontation context that the “Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense 
might wish.”  U.S. v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Although Owens pre-dates Crawford, we will assume Owens continues to have relevance.  See Confronting 
Memory Loss, supra note 11, at 120. 
224 See Unwrapping the Box, supra note 5, at 512-13; Crump, supra note 53 at 150 (“The Court’s most 
recent confrontation decision [Williams] shows, in operation, the coalition that can overrule Crawford—
and arguably, this decision does, in fact, overrule it.”).  The Mendez-Diaz dissenters (Justices Kennedy, 
Roberts, Breyer, and Alito) constituted the plurality in Williams, suggesting that, but for precedent, those 
four Justices may not even have believed a single analyst must testify in order to admit forensic reports 
consistent with the Confrontation Clause.  See Unwrapping the Box, supra note 5, at 512-13; Melendez-
Diaz, 557 U.S. at 330; Williams, 567 U.S. at 55.   If the plurality had not been able to use its two theories 
for why the Confrontation Clause did not bar admission of the evidence—i.e., the “not-targeted-person” 
and “not-for-truth” theories—they might have suggested another theory, such as one based on reliability. 
See Unwrapping the Box, supra note 5, at 512-13 (noting reliability is also mentioned in Bryant).  Indeed, 
the dissent in Williams seemed to suggest the plurality “desire[d] to limit Melendez–Diaz and Bullcoming in 
whatever way possible [.]” See Williams, 567 U.S. at 141; see also Arons, supra note 5, at 736.  Evidence 
of the Court’s desire to reduce the impact of Crawford may also be drawn from the more recent case of 
Clark.  Although not a forensic reports case, Clark’s majority opinion advances the relatively novel theory 
that the primary purpose test is not wholly determinative, noting for instance, that the Confrontation Clause 
does not bar statements which would have been admissible at the founding.  See Comment on Clark, supra 
note 78; Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2180 (“We have recognized that the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit 
the introduction of out-of-court statements that would have been admissible in a criminal case at the time of 
the founding.”).  This theory greatly expands upon the potential dying declaration exception mentioned in a 
footnote in Crawford, and might constitute a partial “escape hatch” from the primary purpose test in future 
cases.  See Comment on Clark, supra note 78; Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2180.  In Crawford, the Court stated: 
“This is not to deny, . . . that ‘[t]here were always exceptions to the general rule of exclusion’ of hearsay 
evidence. . . . Several had become well established by 1791. . . . But there is scant evidence that exceptions 
were invoked to admit testimonial statements against the accused in a criminal case.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. 
at 56.  However, in footnote 6, the Crawford Court recognized an exception for dying declarations.  See id. 
at 56 n.6 (“The one deviation we have found involves dying declarations.  The existence of that exception 
as a general rule of criminal hearsay law cannot be disputed. . . . Although many dying declarations may 
not be testimonial, there is authority for admitting even those that clearly are. . . . We need not decide in 
this case whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial dying declarations.  If 
this exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.”). 
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favor a bright-line-type approach—which is easier for lower courts to apply—rather than 
some type of multi-factor balancing test.225 
 
A. Interim Communications Not Testimonial Approach 
 
 One approach that the Court could adopt would be to find that express or implied 
statements by interim analysts in a forensic process chain are non-testimonial.  We will 
refer to this as the “Interim Communications Not Testimonial Approach.” 
Under this approach, for instance, the analyst asserting a match between the DNA 
of the accused and that which was found at the crime scene would normally need to testify.  
Similarly, the initial analyst or analysts in the chain—who, for instance, can more easily 
testify as to the source of the samples—would need to testify.  In contrast, interim analysts 
merely making oral or written statements to a subsequent analyst in the forensic process 
chain would normally not be required to testify.   
The rationale for not requiring interim analyst testimony would be that statements 
to a subsequent analyst in the chain—perhaps concerning what a given analyst has found 
or done when passing on a sample to the next analyst—would be considered non-
testimonial.   This approach would presume that these interim statements would normally 
not be made for the primary purpose of use as evidence at trial, and instead would primarily 
be for other purposes, such as producing a quality and accurate reading, reflecting what has 
been done or not done, providing helpful background information, ensuring chain of 
custody, or noting whether certain lab procedures have been followed.  In some 
circumstances, an interim analyst may not even be aware of why a test is being done.  For 
instance, in a given DNA test, the analysts working on the samples may not know if their 
work will be used for a murder investigation, paternity test, or to match remains in a mass 
grave from wartime.  In other circumstance, interim analysts may be aware that their 
statements—or the forensic process of which they are a part—will be used as evidence or 
in an investigation.  However, the individual oral or written statements of such interim 
analysts would likely still not be for a primarily testimonial purpose.226   
The Interim Communications Not Testimonial Approach could also be adapted to 
fit different definitions of testimonial that the Court may ultimately prefer, in particular: (i) 
the standard definition: having the “primary purpose” of establishing or proving “past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution”;227 and (ii) Justice Alito’s 
enhanced definition in Williams, which seemingly required the statement to be specifically 
accusatory of the accused;228 and (iii) the definition of the Delaware Supreme Court in 
                                                 
225 See Confronting Memory Loss, supra note 11, at 121 n.181 (expressing belief that “the Court would 
prefer a bright-line approach [as to a different Confrontation Clause issue] due to [the Court’s] criticism of 
the subjectivity of the Roberts reliability approach” and due to criticism of the “primary purpose” test’s 
subjectivity). 
226 Subsequent analysts in the forensic chain may assume the work of a prior analyst was accurate, but such 
subsequent analysts would not actually be asserting this.  Such an approach may be seen as consistent with 
Federal Rule of Evidence 703 and related state analogues, as well as with Williams.  In fact, the situation 
under the Interim Communications Not Testimonial Approach may be seen as easier for the Court than the 
situation in Williams in certain instances, since under the Interim Communications Not Testimonial 
Approach the interim statements themselves would generally be non-testimonial. 
227 Bryant, 562 U.S. at 375; Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
228 See A Game of Katso and Mouse, supra note 4, at 53; Williams, 567 U.S. at 58 (“The report was 
produced before any suspect was identified. The report was sought not for the purpose of obtaining 
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Chavis: “the purpose of the statement in proving an essential element of the crime.”229  
Indeed, the court in Chavis seemingly suggested that statements by analysts relating to 
adherence to protocols or standard procedures—or to the absence of any irregularities—
may be non-testimonial.230 
Under the Interim Communications Not Testimonial Approach, it would be 
necessary to identify who is an interim witness not requiring production.  We do not believe 
the Court would find it practical to require proof—perhaps by affidavit—of what each 
analyst’s primary purpose was in a given case.231  Instead, we assume the Court would 
adopt a more structured approach for lower court’s to utilize.  For instance, under an 
approach using the standard definition of testimonial, the Court could set a presumption 
that the final analyst in the chain—e.g., the ultimate analyst who asserts a match between 
the alleged killer’s DNA and the DNA from the crime scene—and the first person in the 
chain—e.g., the analyst responsible for checking the integrity of the packaging and origin 
of the sample(s)—would need to testify.  The Court could then set a presumption that the 
statements of all other analysts—i.e., the interim analysts—would normally be non-
testimonial.  Finally, the Court could determine that, if the defense is able to show any 
                                                 
evidence to be used against petitioner, who was not even under suspicion at the time, but for the purpose of 
finding a rapist who was on the loose.  And the profile that Cellmark provided was not inherently 
inculpatory.”).  Justice Alito’s approach would, in certain cases—such as when no perpetrator has been 
identified—require less analysts to testify.  Indeed, in a case where no suspect is identified or even 
contemplated, perhaps the Court would simply find that no analyst need testify.  See A Game of Katso and 
Mouse, supra note 4, at 53 (discussing Williams plurality opinion). 
229 Chavis, 227 A.3d at 1091-92.  In a separate part of the opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court alluded to 
a seemingly slightly different formulation, when it found that the non-testifying analysts were not testifying 
to the “final result” of the analysis, meaning it was unclear that their work was testimonial under Melendez-
Diaz, a case the court noted concerned certificates which attested to the “result” of forensic analysis.  Id.  
We will assume that this “final result” formulation was intended to be consistent with—rather than distinct 
from—the Delaware Supreme Court’s “essential element” formulation.  Even if the “final result” 
formulation were distinct, a version of the Interim Communications Not Testimonial Approach could be 
fashioned to fit it.  Under an Interim Communications Not Testimonial Approach adapted to either Chavis 
formulation, we anticipate less analysts would need to testify in certain cases than would need to under an 
approach fitted to the standard definition for testimoniality.  We also note that either Chavis formulation 
goes too far in narrowing the confrontation right in non-forensics cases.  For example, imagine police were 
investigating a murder case allegedly stemming from the defendant’s obsession with the victim. Suppose 
the prosecution sought to use a statement made by a declarant to police that the declarant saw the 
defendant’s car in the parking lot of the victim’s office several times.  This statement would be used as a 
circumstantial step in the murder case—i.e., it would not be stating a “final result” or an “essential 
element”—and so this circumstantial link in the chain of evidence could be excluded from coverage. 
230 Id. at 1091 (“Even Chavis only posits that the non-testifying analysts’ statements relate to their 
adherence to testing protocols and the absence of irregularities (following standard operating procedures 
and not seeing any evidence of taint or contamination)—he does not argue that those statements in and of 
themselves were used to prove his identity or any other element of the crimes he was charged with.”).   
Thus, the court noted, statements of analysts that they examined or manipulated DNA swabs in a certain 
manner would not be considered to have provided testimony “against” the defendant, as required by the 
Confrontation Clause.  Id. at 1093.  Under a Chavis approach, while a DNA profile may help prove the 
identity of an alleged criminal, intermediary steps in the process do not prove—or seek to prove—anything.  
Id. 
231 The primary purpose test is also an objective test, meaning the motivation of the speaker, listener, and/or 
solicitor of the statement may be relevant.  Moreover, the problem of “mixed motives” may impose further 
difficulties in determining a statement’s primary purpose.  See supra Part II. 
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statement from an interim analyst had a primary testimonial purpose, such interim analyst 
would then need to be produced.232 
 
B. Hypothetical Assumption Approach 
 
 A second approach the Court could take would be to build upon Justice Alito’s 
plurality opinion in Williams and find that a testifying expert is merely basing her opinion 
on the hypothetical assumption that statements of the non-testifying analysts are truthful.  
We will refer to this as the “Hypothetical Assumption Approach.”  
Under this approach the Court would find that a testifying analyst is not making 
any type of assertion that the statements of any other analysts are true.  This way—
consistent with Williams and Federal Rule of Evidence 703—there would be no need for 
the prosecution to produce any such other analysts.  This approach would be best handled 
through use of a hypothetical question to the testifying expert.233  
Consistent with this approach, the prosecution would still need to independently 
prove that the testifying expert’s assumption is true in order for the fact finder to accept the 
expert’s opinion at trial.  For instance, to take an example based on Chavis, a testifying 
expert who handled a match between two DNA profiles might be assuming that one sample 
came from the crime scene and the other from the accused.  It would fall to the prosecution 
to actually prove the source of these samples.  Similarly, an expert testifying about a report 
finding a certain substance on accused’s person was methamphetamine may be assuming 
that the sample of the substance came from the accused.  The prosecution would still need 
to prove that such assumption was correct.   
As a matter of evidence, however, the only way for the prosecution to prove such 
non-testifying analysts’ statements are true may be calling each relevant analyst to testify.  
This would mean that, as a practical matter, in many cases the Hypothetical Assumption 
Approach may not appreciably reduce the number of analysts who actually must testify at 
trial.  If it so chose, the Court could seek to help mitigate this by recognizing a routine 
practice-type argument—pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 406—to the effect that 
forensic reports out of a specific lab have always produced accurate results.234  More 
specifically, for instance, if it was assumed by a testifying analyst that an interim analyst 
had followed lab procedures in calibrating an apparatus, it might be possible to introduce 
evidence—perhaps through testimony and relevant business records—showing that such 
procedure was always followed by the lab or analyst in calibrating the apparatus.235 
 
                                                 
232 In this connection, the Court could allow the defense discovery of all the interim papers so that the 
defense could investigate whether anyone in the chain had a primarily testimonial purpose. 
233 See Williams, 567 U.S. at 57. 
234 Rule 406 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: “Evidence of a person’s habit or an organization’s 
routine practice may be admitted to prove that on a particular occasion the person or organization acted in 
accordance with the habit or routine practice.  The court may admit this evidence regardless of whether it is 
corroborated or whether there was an eyewitness.” 
235 In addition, Justice Alito in Williams suggested that circumstantial evidence—the fact a sample was sent 
to the lab in the circumstances in Williams and was later returned, and the fact that the lab’s test results 
squared with the victim’s identification of the culprit—apparently could solve the requirement of 
independent proof for both the source problem (i.e., where the sample came from) and the internal validity 
problem (i.e., the following of protocols).  See Williams, 567 U.S. at 74-77. 
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C. More Than Surrogate Approach 
 
 A third approach could be for the Court to permit a single analyst—who is more 
than the “surrogate” witness discussed in Bullcoming—to testify.  We will refer to this as 
the “More Than Surrogate Approach.” 
  We have previously argued that it may already be sufficient to offer the testimony 
of a single forensic analyst, so long as such analyst is considerably more than a “surrogate” 
witness and certainly not a mere “conduit” for admission of un-confronted hearsay.236  In 
determining whether a given analyst would meet the Confrontation Clause under this 
approach, we believe at least three factors may be relevant.  First, it may be relevant how 
prominently the report was used at trial, that is, was it introduced or extensively 
mentioned?237  Second, it may be relevant to consider the degree to which the testifying 
expert is exercising her own judgment in constructing her opinion, including the 
thoroughness of her review of the statements of other analysts and her involvement in the 
specific process at issue, laboratory conducting the process, and other processes of like 
kind.238  Third, it may be relevant the degree to which the testifying analyst permits the 
accused to fully cross-examine the entire forensic analysis.239   
The ideal testing analyst under the More Than Surrogate Approach might be 
extremely closely connected to the testing process and the lab at issue, be able to testify to 
extensive steps of internal validation and an intensive review and analysis of the other 
analysts’ work, and afford the accused a sufficient opportunity to cross-examine her 
regarding all the steps in the forensic process.240  The analyst should also offer an 
independent opinion based at least in part on her own analysis, and not simply act as a 
conduit for admitting hearsay.241  Although qualifying as a testifying analyst under this 
approach may be difficult, if the Court were to set clear criteria on who would be a 
sufficient testifying analyst, labs could adjust accordingly.  Once labs understood the 
criteria, they could begin to designate at the outset of a process who would be the testifying 
analyst—should one be needed—and ensure that such person meets relevant criteria.  Clear 
criteria would also allow other local stakeholders to better prepare for trial. 
 
D. Segment Representative Approach 
 
A fourth approach the Court might consider would be to require production of at 
least one representative analyst for each identified segment of a forensic process.  We will 
refer to this as the “Segment Representative Approach.” 
We can imagine two versions of this approach: (i) a version based on “discrete 
phases” in a forensic process (with each phase being referred to as a “segment”); or (ii) a 
version based on a set “number of analysts” (with such set number of analysts being 
referred to as a “segment”).  As to the version based on discrete phases, Justice Breyer’s 
explanation of a typical DNA analysis in the appendix to his Williams opinion may be 
                                                 
236 See A Game of Katso and Mouse, supra note 4, at 54-55 (discussing approach in United States v. Katso, 
74 M.J. 273 (C.A.A.F. 2015)). 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Id.  It is unclear that the testifying expert in Chavis would sufficiently meet these criteria. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. 
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illustrative.  That analysis involved multiple steps in preparing the suspect’s sample’s 
profile, multiple steps in preparing the crime scene sample’s profile, and then a step for 
comparison between the two profiles to reach a conclusion on whether they match.242  The 
Court could identify work on the suspect’s sample as one segment, work on the crime scene 
sample as a second segment, and work on the match as a third segment.  Under the discrete 
phases version of the Segment Representative Approach, if the prosecution were seeking 
to utilize the results of the analysis in Justice Breyer’s appendix against an accused, the 
prosecution would be required to produce at least one analyst associated with the suspect 
sample’s segment of the analysis, at least one associated with the crime scene sample’s 
segment of the analysis, and at least one analyst involved in conducting the analysis to 
check for a match between the two samples.  One key challenge with this version—which 
might make the Court less likely to adopt it—would be enumerating sufficient guidance on 
what should constitute a segment, such that the guidance would work for the many 
variations of forensic processes.243  As to the number of analysts version of the Segment 
Representative Approach, the Court could, for instance, decide that a segment consisted of 
five forensic analysts.  This would mean that, while it would be possible for one analyst to 
testify on behalf of herself and at most four other analysts, if six analysts were involved, 
then at least two analysts from the group of analysts would need to testify.  The theory 
under this version of the approach being that, the greater the number of analysts a given 
analyst is representing, the greater the likelihood that the testifying analyst will be unable 
to afford an accused a sufficient opportunity to confront relevant evidence. 
In some ways, this Segment Representative Approach—either version—would be 
a related approach to the More Than Surrogate Approach, since each representative analyst 
would be a type of “more than surrogate” for her or his segment.  Also, as in the More Than 
Surrogate Approach, each representative would still need to satisfy Court-adopted criteria 
to be a sufficient representative.  We assume such criteria would be similar to those we 
discussed in connection with the More Than Surrogate Approach.  However, the Segment 
Representative Approach is still distinct from the More Than Surrogate Approach.  Under 
the discrete phases version of this approach, for instance, an analyst who merely conducted 
the comparison between two DNA profiles—without being involved in preparing either 
profile—could not, alone, meet the Confrontation Clause, even if she otherwise met the 
criteria set out in our discussion of the More Than Surrogate Approach.  Similarly, under 
the number of analysts version of this approach, an analyst who met all the criteria, but 
who was only one of ten analysts involved in the analysis—assuming the Court set a limit 
of five analysts for a segment—could not meet the Confrontation Clause.  
In practice, under either version of this approach, it is still possible that a single 
individual could be a sufficient representative, and that such expert’s testimony alone could 
be sufficient.  For instance, under the discrete phases version, the expert in Chavis seems 
to have been involved in each segment of the relevant DNA analysis—assuming the Court 
defined the segments as suspect’s sample, crime scene sample, and match.  If such expert 
                                                 
242 Williams, 567 U.S. at 99-102. 
243 Connected to this, the Court may find it challenging to determine how granularly it wants to define a 
segment.  In principle, many intermediate steps—such as checking in a sample, preparing the sample, and 
interpreting relevant data—could be considered segments.  If the Court did adopt a discrete phases version 
of this approach, we assume the Court would seek to define segments very broadly, such that the number of 
analysts who must testify would be limited. 
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could have fully satisfied the other Court-adopted criteria—which it is not clear to us she 
could—her testimony alone might have been sufficient.  Under the number of analysts 
version, if there were only four total individuals involved in an analysis—and assuming 
the Court had set a limit of five analysts for a segment and all other criteria were met—one 
analyst alone could be sufficient. 
Consistent with our recommendation under the More Than Surrogate Approach, 
the best way to make this approach workable would be for the Court to set out clear criteria 
as to what would constitute a relevant segment—either discrete phases of a process or a set 
number of analysts—and also as to who will be a sufficient testifying representative.  Labs 
could use the criteria to pre-designate segment representatives and other local stakeholders 
could likewise use it to better prepare.  
 
E. Important Analyst Approach 
 
 A fifth approach the Court might consider would be to require production of only 
the most important analyst or analysts.  We will refer to this as the “Important Analyst 
Approach.”  
We believe that there are at least two ways that importance could be judged.  First, 
the Court could seek to set out in the abstract what roles in a forensic process would be 
deemed important.  Under this version of the approach, we suspect that the Court would 
assign importance based on the general significance of individual roles in forensic analysis.  
We assume, for instance, that the most likely candidates for general importance would the 
first and last analysts in a forensic chain.  The last analyst in a chain—like the testifying 
analyst in Chavis—may be the most obvious example of an important witness, since she is 
the one actually responsible for the match between the profiles from the accused and the 
crime scene.244  Without her match, the analysis of the other analysts would not have much 
value in a case.  Interim analyst, in contrast, would likely not be deemed important, in that 
they may generally be involved with mere chain of custody or other intermediate processes.  
However, chain of custody is still important to a case, in that if the two samples are not 
from the crime scene and the accused, respectively, the conclusion presented by the 
ultimate analyst as to any match is meaningless.  As such, we suspect that the Court would 
also deem the first analyst in a chain important.  Perhaps the Court could set a presumption 
that the first and last analysts in a chain are important, and then afford the defendant the 
right to demonstrate that other analysts in the specific process involved were also 
important.   
Under a second version of the Important Analyst Approach, the Court could decide 
that, rather than setting out a presumption as to which analysts would be important in the 
abstract, a specific determination should be made in each individual case based on the 
specific process and facts involved.  This might entail looking at various factors in the 
specific case, such as which analysts’ statements feature prominently or which statements 
are more central to the specific case.  We assume that the Court might disfavor such a case-
by-case approach, however. 
 For any of this approach, it would be extremely helpful if the Supreme Court could 
offer clear guidance on which analyst or analysts will be deemed important.  Clear guidance 
is especially helpful in the context of this approach, since “important” may be seen as an 
                                                 
244 Chavis, 227 A.3d at 1083-86. 
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even more subjective concept than those described in connection with certain other of our 
approaches. 
 
F. Actual Evidence Approach 
 
 A sixth approach the Court might consider is to determine what is the actual 
evidence at issue in a given case: the testifying expert or the work of other analysts who 
are not produced.  We will refer to this as the “Actual Evidence Approach.” 
Under this approach, a court would need to determine what the evidence really is, 
such as by asking who is predominantly speaking in the case.  In making this determination, 
the Court would likely need to adopt a set of factors to consider, some of which may be 
similar to those suggested in connection with the More Than Surrogate Approach.  First, 
the Court might consider how much independent judgment the testifying expert put into 
her or his opinion.  Second, the Court might consider how much actual participation the 
expert witness had in the forensic process.  Third, the Court could consider whether the 
report itself is being offered, or if not, whether material from the report that the testifying 
expert would not personally know will be extensively mentioned.  Fourth, the Court might 
consider the degree to which the offered testimony—or final argument—rests upon 
material in the report not personally known by the testifying expert.  Fifth, and finally, the 
Court could consider how much independent evidence the prosecution offers on the 
material from the report that the testifying expert does not personally know.245   
The prime downside to this approach is that a case-by-case, balancing, 
determination is all but assured, and it would be rather indeterminate and somewhat 




 The purpose of this Article is to identify and discuss six plausible approaches the 
U.S. Supreme Court may consider in addressing the multi-analyst problem.  Since we 
assume the Supreme Court would prefer not to have all analysts testify—and indeed, would 
prefer to minimize the number of analysts required—we suspect that the approaches we 
have suggested in this Article are the most plausible.  If we had to speculate which of these 
six approaches the Court would be most likely to prefer, we believe some form of the 
Interim Communications Not Testimonial Approach would be favored. 
Requiring any forensic analyst to testify may be burdensome for labs and law 
enforcement, and increasing the number of analysts required for testimony would 
correspondingly compound the difficulty.246  Nevertheless, the degree of confrontation 
afforded defendants by the Constitution cannot necessarily turn upon cost or convenience.  
Courts and commenters have suggested means of mitigating the burden on law 
                                                 
245 For instance, a testifying expert—such as the one in Chavis—might not have personal knowledge of the 
source of the original samples from the accused and the crime scene.  If the prosecution does not offer 
much independent evidence of such items in the report, then the prosecution would be seen as relying 
primarily upon the report (i.e., the non-testifying analysts’ statements) to prove them (i.e., for their truth), 
rather than as mere assumptions of the testifying expert (i.e., mere hypotheticals) in illuminating the 
testifying expert’s own independent opinion. 
246 See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 332-33; Grabbing the Bullcoming, supra note 5, at 552-56; A 
Game of Katso and Mouse, supra note 4, at 35-36. 
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enforcement when forensic analysts must appear, such as use of notice-and-demand 
statutes, retesting, or even video testimony.247  We believe that one of the most important 
things the Supreme Court could do would be to set some guidance on which analyst within 
the multi-analyst chain must testify.  If courts, labs, and local stakeholders know an 
approach in advance of trial, this should help reduce costs and uncertainty, or at least allow 
relevant stakeholders to be better prepared.  As Justice Gorsuch has expressed more 
generally about confrontation rights in forensics cases post-Williams, the Court “owe[s] 
lower courts struggling to abide our holdings more clarity than we have afforded them 
[.]”248 
                                                 
247 See generally Eli Scott, Confrontation Compromise: How Modern State Rules of Evidence Could 
Ensure Transparent Forensic Reports, 56 CRIM. LAW BULLETIN 2 (2020); see also A Game of Katso and 
Mouse, supra note 4, at 37 n.97 (discussing notice-and-demand statutes and retesting); Bullcoming, 564 
U.S. at 665-67 (same); Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326-27 (discussing notice-and-demand statutes); Arons, 
supra note 5, at 733-36 (discussing, among other things, notice-and-demand statutes and video recording).  
248 Stuart, 139 S. Ct. at 37 (Gorsuch J., dissenting). 
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